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ABSTRACT 
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We study the effects of network connections between banks issuing stock recommendations and the 
corresponding board of directors. Based on data we extracted from the Standard & Poor’s Capital 
IQ database, we empirically identify a large number of such banking ties forming a unique 
database. Following recent focus on social network studies and the need for more transparency in 
the financial market for investor protection, our database is the foundation for further study. We 
raise and propose relevant research question to be pursued. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Significance of the Proposed Study 
Information is a key driver for analysts’ stock recommendations and research reports 
generating business for the adjacent brokerage department. It can become an important competitive 
advantage if the received information is new and has not been spread entirely over diverse networks 
to all the market participants and, therefore, has not been fully incorporated into the market yet. The 
adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) states that such new insider information must be 
disclosed publicly accessible for over 3000 research analysts working for 350 banks on the sell-side 
in the US (Green et al., 2007). While research indicates that Reg FD has been successfully 
implemented and selective information disclosure on the market has been stopped (e.g. Gintschel 
and Markov (2004); Cohen et al. (2010); Fleischer (2011)), only few authors studied social network 
connections as a transmitter for proprietary information. A recent consent order issued by the 
Massachusetts Security Division to Citigroup Global Markets Inc. shows practical insides and 
evidence of how significant personal network ties can be for information exchange (Massachusetts, 
2012). The investigation revealed the exchange of proprietary information (i.e. a selective 
disclosure) between a junior analyst and a third party alumni network connections.1 We got 
excellent insights into the practical work of an sell-side analyst from James J. Valentine’s best-
practice recommendations, a top ranked Wall Street analyst (e.g. Exhibit 9.2: Assessing and 
Approaching Information Contacts in Valentine (2011)) reconfirming the significance of 
networking for analysts’ provision of information. The following quote underlines this idea: 
“One of the primary reasons analysts with more experience are better than those with less, is the vast 
network of contacts they’ve developed over time  (…) you need information to develop unique stock 
                                                          
 
1 Email of a junior analyst to a TechCrunch.com employee: “I am ramping up coverage on FB and thought you guys 
might like to see how the street is thinking about it (and our estimates). Any feedback on the investment positives and 
risks would be super helpful. I want to make sure I'm thinking about this the right way (…). This of course is 
confidential” (Massachusetts, 2012). 
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insights, and the best way to get this information is through word of mouth; in this way there’s a 
better chance it’s not already in the market” (Valentine, 2011). 
Since company information must be disclosed publicly by companies and is easily 
searchable and accessible online from almost all over the world nowadays, such information lost its 
inherent value since all market participants have it. Proprietary information via network ties, 
however, is only available to a limited audience and, therefore, has become even more important as 
a distinguishing stock research driver. Hence, our objective is to analyze the effects of such network 
ties for analysts’ research and the actors that make use of it. More specifically, our objective is to 
empirically investigate the network ties to previous employer, which have been largely neglected by 
prior research. We build a unique database of network ties connecting board executives of United 
States (U.S.) traded companies to their prior employment with a bank. Such previous employment 
networks are relevant for cases where the previous employer issues research about the current 
employer’s stocks. This happens because the board member has essential insider information that 
could be acquired by the research department of the old employer due to the densely connected 
network and the short distance between both parties. 
We raise several relevant research questions for further study. To the best of our knowledge 
this is the first study that builds such a banking tie database using data gathered from Standard & 
Poor’s Capital IQ database. Analysts’ research reports offer the unique chance to evaluate 
performance since their reports give a clear recommendation and a price target that can be evaluated 
ex-post. We take up and propose a similar question to previous studies; however, our underlying 
data set is different. For example, previous studies observed the effects of BANKERS ON THE BOARD 
of public traded companies (e.g. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) or Dittmann et al. (2010)), whereas 
our dataset adds a new dimension to this research by also considering BANKERS ON THE BOARD 
with only a prior and not a current affiliation to a bank, a setting for which similar effects could be 
expected. One of our main questions, the bank’s ability to gather superior information through the 
network tie, has already been studied by Cohen et al. (2010). Based on an alumni tie network, the 
authors confirm the significance of such ties as a possible competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the 
authors also indicate that this effect vanished by the legislative action of introducing Reg FD. Our 
study will investigate if the later effect also holds for an employment network or if the social 
network is indeed still relevant. 
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This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter II, we first introduce the equity analyst 
research profession and work environment. We highlight key steps and drivers in the research 
process before elaborating typical conflicts of interests that analysts and company board members 
are exposed to in their daily work environment. We then raise the question of the informational 
value of analyst research as an essential premise for our study. An overview of network theory and 
a review of related studies lead us to our hypothesis (Chapter III) and the introduction to our 
methodology in Chapter IV. We conclude with an analysis of the data we collected (Chapter V) and 
provide an overview for future use of our data (Chapter VI).   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
We begin our review by discussing the analyst profession, the requirements and context of 
the job. Furthermore, we elaborate on the daily workflow and present how much is known about the 
underlying research process that analysts undertake to identify the key drivers and techniques for 
issuing recommendations. We follow up by providing an overview of various stimuli which 
influence analysts’ perpetual neutrality. Many of these possible biases (e.g. favorably 
recommending clients of one’s own investment banking department) have been discussed 
extensively in literature. We will highlight these biases and present the current Status Quo of 
research before we discuss analysts’ research value. At last, we will respond to the question on the 
comparative advantage and information benefits of social ties in networks (private or within an 
organizational structure). This field is fairly challenging to assess due to the difficulty of mapping 
social ties. However, recent studies have found ways to uncover the impact of social ties in different 
contexts. We will mention the key results and then focus on ties of executive boards and in banking. 
For all of our literature review we restrict our work to the sell-side analyst’s context but 
occasionally touch upon the buy-side.  
Traditional research concerning financial analysts has been diverse and can be found along a 
chain that starts off with research about company information disclosure, continues with analysts’ 
choice of coverage, the following information collection and ends with the decision process that 
leads to the research report. Major research has been done to analyze the value of research reports 
created by the analyst for potential investors. This research includes analysts’ conflict of interest 
that naturally arises when handing out research reports and recommendation about third parties. 
Although analyst research has been extensively discussed in the last decades, many research 
questions still remain unanswered and warrant further research.2  
  
                                                          
 
2 Consult Ramnath et al. (2008) for an excellent review of financial analyst forecasting literature from the years 1992 – 
2006, giving an overview over several broad areas for further research. 
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2.1 Sell-Side Analysts 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
Analysts’ main objective is to serve investors by conducting financial research to forecast 
and incorporate future trends and prospects of the financial market, specific sectors of industry and 
individual companies. Thereby, analysts seek to convey a stock’s true value (e.g. stocks that the 
capital market mispriced) while also helping investors watch management closely. Diverse types of 
clients demand different types of research focus and scopes of operation. Some potential investors 
may seek stocks that have proven to have a continuous growth potential, while others may seek 
stocks that are currently undervalued and therefore have a long-term potential to converge to its real 
value. Sell-side analysts in investment banks focus on investment research reports that will attract 
customers and revenue (e.g. transaction fees) for its affiliated investment banking and brokerage 
department. Therefore, sell-side analysts naturally focus on large cap firms which promise to have 
high trading volumes (cp. Previts et al. (1994); Womack (1996); Irvine (2001); Barber et al. 
(2001)). Buy-side analysts, however, exclusively focus on supporting its direct clients for 
identifying investment opportunities for the portfolio that they (more precisely portfolio manager) 
are representing.3 Therefore, research reports are only disclosed4 to their clients and not to the 
general public. The interaction between buy-side and sell-side analysts5 is important for both 
parties. The sell-side analyst would like to “act on their research” to promote their portfolio and 
possibly gain commissions (Jacobs, 2005). The buy-side analysts, on the contrary, profit from 
additional sector insights (e.g. sell-side assessment of industry dynamics) that they may not be able 
to explore otherwise due to lack of time or access to information (e.g. corporate senior 
management). In addition, buy-side analysts verify their own research6 while also progressing faster 
in their research based on the industry sector’s discussions with sell-side experts. While doing so, 
analysts not only need to appraise the informational value to avoid interference (e.g. false 
information), but also need to be resourceful regarding the time they are investing (Valentine, 
2011). Independent analysts who are not affiliated to any particular employer or fund are perceived 
                                                          
 
3 Typically, buy-side analyst work for asset management firms or institutional investors that represent pension, mutual 
and private money funds, insurance companies or university endowments.  
4 We acknowledge that information, however, is always revealed through their trades to a certain extend. 
5 Compare to (Valentine, 2011) p.67ff for more information. 
6 Busse et al. (2012) for example argue that buy-side analyst follow the sell-side.  
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as free of typical investment banking-associated conflicts of interest. They are either institutional or 
individual investor-focused and try to fill niches (e.g. alternative industry sectors or portfolios) not 
covered by other analysts on the sell-side. Independent analysts sell their research as different 
products with different informational value (e.g. as simple newsletter or extensive reports). The 
stock coverage can be very detailed or more general and therefore include up to 200 stocks 
(portfolio manager), whereas buy-side analysts typically cover up to 40-60 stocks and sell-side 
analysts only cover 10-15 stocks (Green et al. (2007); Valentine (2011)).  
Analysts act as financial intermediaries counterbalancing the asymmetrically distributed 
information in the capital market. Jurisdictions require companies listed in the stock exchange to 
disclose information in the form of quarterly reports according to U.S. GAAP7 and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. Accounting standards for publicly traded companies help the stakeholders get 
access to key relevant data in order to be able to continuously monitor their investment. However, 
companies most often refrain from revealing information to the market to protect themselves from 
their competitors but, therefore, also restrict stakeholder and potential investors in their decision 
making which then again may affect a company’s cost of capital and stock liquidity (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). However, the increase in company information disclosure may also not be unambiguously favorable based on the costs caused by agency problems (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2012). 
In addition, publicly available information is susceptible to subjectivity. Companies 
exploiting legal accounting scope in publishing data for various reasons (e.g. to influence investors 
or for tax purposes) which frame the company in the most positive light.8 Hence, analysts need to 
be aware of such accounting practices and interpret released information in-depth to evaluate past 
performance. In turn, companies profit from an informed and efficient market which makes their 
stock more liquid, less volatile, more valuable, and therefore decreases the firms’ cost of capital. 
This is not only because of the additional stock promotion from the sell-side to new investors, but 
                                                          
 
7 The Security Exchange Commission (SEC) has been debating about switching to the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the last years. IFRS is emerging to become the world’s standard accounting principle. 
A decision is expected in the year 2012 which could constrain publicly traded companies in the U.S. to follow and 
adopt IFRS in the near future (U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, 2012). 
8 This practice has been referred to in literature as cooking the books, aggressive accounting methods or creative or 
innovative accounting. This is particularly true for earnings figures which can easily be manipulated (cp. Enron 
accounting scandal).  
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also because investors are better informed, and understand both the possible benefits and potential 
risks.  
 
2.1.2 Analysts Research 
It is vital to understand analysts’ research process issuing stock recommendations, price 
targets, and earnings forecasts to determine research reports’ credibility and informative value when 
making investment decisions. Firstly, we review literature on the sources and content of analyst 
report information, and summarize the drivers (e.g. what kind of information is needed and which 
sources are used) for successful research reports.9 Secondly, we look at the analyst profession itself 
and review the qualifications top analysts share to better understand the analyst’s personal impact 
(cp. APPENDIX E for an overview). By identifying valuable relevant attributes and drivers we can 
comprehend how the analyst exploits data (public or proprietary) and which information or skillset 
contributes and influences most of the report results. Analysts interact with several departments and 
people inside the bank (e.g. fund managers in the sales department and traders who buy and sell 
stocks) as well as outside the bank (e.g. other analysts) that all make decisions based on their 
research and recommendations. Therefore, forecasts based on bad assumptions will have a negative 
influence on their own work and reputation, and will directly affect the bank’s clients. Hence, 
analysts need to rely on a key skill set and relevant information on-hand to predict the future the 
best way possible. Following a research process, most studies have relied on two main methods to 
conclude analysts’ preferences regarding their information sources. First, several authors took a 
survey-based approach10 to get individual analyst feedback and, second, other authors statistically 
analyzed the content of research reports11 to infer the underlying research process. Both models 
offer an insight into the analyst profession, but are limited in reflecting the real world. Surveys 
provide direct information from the analyst, but might lack objectivity and, therefore, might not be 
conducive to insights in controversial issues. Content analysis, on the other hand, is limited to the 
information provided in the report and can only try to estimate the underlying information without 
being able to include additional research that analyst might consider without explicitly mentioning 
in their report. 
                                                          
 
9 The same question has been raised by studies analyzing research analysts and company management to discover how 
management tune company disclosures seeking better analyst reports.  
10 Gleason et al. (2012); Graham et al. (2002); Imam et al. (2008); Orens and Lybaert (2010); Groysberg et al. (2011a). 
11 Previts et al. (1994); Demirakos et al. (2004); Breton and Taffler (2001); Asquith et al. (2005); Imam et al. (2008). 
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Analyst’s sources of information 
We provide a brief overview to what has been published in scientific context.  
Previts et al. (1994) refer to an analyst survey of the Financial Executive Research Foundation 
which lists the “five most-used sources of information, in descending order as:” 
(1) Company annual report12, (2) Form 10-k13 (annual report), (3) company quarterly report, (4) 
other analysts or professionals, and (5) company management. 
Despite the low frequency of the use of company management information, it was reported 
as the most relevant one. A more recent survey of Graham et al. (2002) confirms these results but 
do not break up their survey in Frequency of Use and Most Important Information but rather infer 
the importance by ranking the frequency of use (see APPENDIX D for a full overview of 
information sources and the corresponding frequency of use).  
Public information and management findings are compromised and once on-hand, are 
systemically analyzed and interpreted for further use in models. The analyst evaluates quantitative 
and qualitative information sources, which can be categorized as:14  
(1) Segment Reporting, (2) Core Earnings, (3) Earnings Quality, (4) Earnings Momentum,               
(5) Balance Sheet Related Findings, (6) Cash Flow Related Findings, (7) Common Size Reports,  
(8) Company Valuation, (9) Nonfinancial Information Findings, (10) Supplemental Findings,     
(11) Management Findings. 
 
Analyst Research Report Content 
The three typical and most known elements of analyst research reports are the stock 
recommendation (specific grade as well as movement), target price forecast15 (point estimate) and 
earnings forecast (one-year or multiple). Asquith et al. (2005) provide a detailed statistical content 
analysis by sampling and categorizing 1126 analyst reports16 in different components over change 
of recommendation. Besides the three typical aforementioned elements, the authors found in their 
                                                          
 
12 Includes written statement, income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement, auditor’s report and segment 
reporting. 
13 See Lehavy et al. (2011) for a study on readability and its implication for the readers of 10-k Forms.   
14 Based on the readings of Previts et al. (1994) and Graham et al. (2002). 
15 The disclosure of price targets became increasingly popular since the mid-1990s (Gleason et al., 2012). 
16 Reports were all published by All-American Research Team members between 1997 - 1999. 
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sample that analysts almost always include the valuation model(s) used and their company 
affiliations (the latter is a required element). Less frequently mentioned was segment data (<10%), 
forecasts for income statement (28%), and cash flow statement (17.1%) as well as balance sheet 
forecasts (5.1%). Besides quantitative information, analysts almost always mention their 
justification (97%) for their recommendations, which most commonly were increase in revenue 
(37%) or earnings (30%), expectation met (31.5%), cost efficiencies (21%), positive management 
(20%), and production introduction (16%).17 These results correspond to the qualitative results that 
Previts et al. (1994) had found in an earlier study. For a better company evaluation, analysts divide 
a corporation into its individual segments and, therefore, particularly value company disclosure of 
segment data (Valentine, 2011). More surprising is that this analysis is hardly ever mentioned in 
their reports (see above). This contributes to the notion that analysts generally consider much more 
information and analysis than is mentioned in their reports.  
 
Analyst’s choice of valuation methodology 
Fundamental analysis is used to estimate a company’s long-term value. Current quantitative 
data from company financial reports serve the analyst as input parameters for their models and the 
following analysis. However, the analysts controls for noise in the quantitative data first (i.e. 
determine the adjusted earnings or the earning’s quality of a company for example), before 
incorporating it into the model (Graham et al., 2002). The most common used valuations methods 
that analysts rely on is relative valuation to a peer (single period) or discounted cash flow valuation 
(DCF) (multi-period) (see Valentine (2011, p. 257) for a discussion on benefits and limitation of 
both approaches). The latter is the more rigorous and advocated method in financial theory 
(Demirakos et al. (2004); Imam et al. (2008)).18 Multi-period models bare the chance to incorporate 
future cash flows which lead to a more accurate long-term evaluation. However, this only holds 
when future cash flows as well as an appropriate discount factor can be assed consistently and 
reliably. In practice, however, Demirakos et al. (2004) provide evidence that the two most 
dominantly employed valuation methods19 by analysts are the rather unsophisticated earnings 
(88.5%) and sales multiples (50%), whereas multi-period discounted cash flow models are only 
                                                          
 
17 Refer to Asquith et al. (2005), p. 252 ff. for more details.  
18 Imam et al. (2008), however, indicate that a residual income-based model “provides superior firm valuation estimates 
to DCF models.” 
19 The dominant method is the method (if they use more than one) that analyst base their decision on. 
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used in 4 out of 10 reports.20 Hybrid valuation models have been found to account only for 17.3% 
of the reports.21 This view has been shared by several survey-based papers in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Imam et al., 2008). However, Imam et al. (2008) indicate that DCF models seem to recently 
receive more and more attention in practice, following the recommendation by financial theory. The 
same authors emphasize that “valuation models are very rarely used in isolation” which Graham et 
al. (2002) survey results also confirm.22 In addition, the choice of valuation model is not determined 
by solely choosing the theoretical best model but is also influenced by multiple aspects. This 
includes the expectations of internal and external clients, the consensus method used in that 
industry, the timely scope of the forecast, personal preference (e.g. what model is easier to 
communicate), and usability for performing the analysis. Ideally, the relative valuation heuristic and 
the fundamental valuation method will both point to the same conclusion. The nature of DCF 
models allows manipulation23 which possibly induces the analyst to implement his prior personal 
opinion about the stock (Imam et al., 2008). The same could be done to yield for proprietary 
information on-hand (e.g. through banking ties) for which DCF allows to form an ex-post 
justification for price targets and recommendations without explicitly referring to the information 
that formed analysts’ opinion.  
In order to determine the final projection of the stock price, the analysts introduce models in 
which company parameters (e.g. trends, new products or company changes) can be periodically 
updated in the form of variables. Besides direct company-related projection, analysts incorporate 
the industry sector information as well as the overall economic outlook. 
 
Qualification shared by top analysts  
Analysts almost always share an academic background or even a certification as foundation 
for their research. However, there has not been a particular course of study as prerequisite necessary 
to work in the analyst profession. Current analysts usually have an academic background (BA or 
higher) in business, economics, or math in combination with technical knowledge or professional 
                                                          
 
20 Compare to Asquith et al. (2005) who report valuation model use as earnings multiples (99.1%), discounted cash 
flow variations (12.8%) and asset multiples (25.1%) in their sample. 
21 We acknowledge that different valuation methods are preferred for different sectors (depending on the availability of 
peers of foreseeable cash flows). 
22 The survey indicates that other models like market-timing, multi-factor risk model or capital asset pricing model do 
play a role. However, financial statement analysis is dominating analysts’ research. 
23 Cash flows projection needs to create as well as finding the appropriate discount rate. 
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experience in one or more industry sectors like engineering, chemistry, biology, and computer 
science. Therefore, the backgrounds and depths of study can be very diverse among analysts, while 
these differences will converge as their on-the-job training and experience evolve and play a more 
significant role. Third-party certification and designation programs are becoming more important as 
a proven standard of knowledge not only for entering a job but also for investors trusting in 
analysts’ research. Among others, these programs include designations like the Chartered Financial 
Analysts (CFA), Certified European Financial Analyst (CEFA), Certified Alternative Investment 
Analyst (CAIA) and Certified International Investment Analyst (CIIA). The daily routines of 
analysts differ and each analyst prioritizes differently. However, there are typical components of 
sell-side analysts’ days. Analysts usually start the day early to be able to collect, assess, and 
comment on the newest press releases before the market opens. The following steps include 
communication with clients (e.g. memos or phone calls for newest updates), coordination with the 
sales department, as well as conveying ideas to the buy-side or to portfolio managers. During 
roadshows these discussions and promotions are held on-site. Spare-time, which does not require 
immediate reaction to new information, is used for research and modeling.24   
Analysts are expected to understand the industry better than anyone else and potentially 
foresee innovations, trends, and other reasons as to why a stock could deviate from everyone’s 
expectation. Communication, influencing, and promotion skills help to acquire the necessary 
information and promote their own research. Furthermore, Valentine (2011) argues that proper time 
management and prioritization of jobs provide competitive advantage. Since there is a lot of 
information on the market and a limited time available, it is important to narrow information and 
sources down to those that drive the stock and add value in interpreting and incorporating into the 
report. Very often such information is not found in the quantitative data released by the company. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that results by Imam et al. (2008) or Macfarquar and Tooley (2009) 
underline the significance of considering qualitative information25 in forming target prices and 
recommendation in practice. Breton and Taffler (2001) even speak of non-financial qualitative 
factors as the “most significant drivers of analyst judgement; in particular an analysis of corporate 
                                                          
 
24 See Valentine (2011, p.29) for sell-side’s and buy-side’s time allocation of different jobs on a work day.  
25 Orens and Lybaert (2010) explain in which context this is the case and provide a categorized overview of qualitative 
information with 71 items in total.  
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management and strategy.”26 This is supported by Fleischer (2011) who see analysis and 
information as “security analysts’ primary competitive tools.” Qualititative information, however, is 
subject to biases as well unless, it comes from an analyst’s trustworthy source. Therefore, analysts 
need to adjust for biases in information sources and counteract companies’ self-marketing 
strategies, while carefully deciding how to weigh out each source. Getting the right information at 
the right time is “critical to an analyst’s success” (Valentine, 2011). 
  
                                                          
 
26 Wasserman et al. (2010) p.49 argue for example that leadership characteristics accounts on average 14% of the 
company performance (conditional to the industry). 
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2.2 Analyst Biases and the Investment Value of Stock Research 
2.2.1 Historic Changes On the Sell-Side  
Regulation Fair Disclosure, introduced on October 23rd of 2000 by the governmental 
organization Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), fundamentally changed the analyst and 
company management relationship and ended the selective information disclosure by companies 
that previously allowed individual analysts and investors a competitive advantage by having 
superior information on-hand. This endorsed a timely advantage in estimating future market 
reaction to the information and, therefore, meant potential monetary benefits. However, this also 
meant that companies had a potential bargaining chip on-hand that they could use against 
beneficiaries of superior information (e.g. banks) to trigger favorable treatment to their benefits 
(e.g. favorable banking services or analyst research). Besides the regulatory change intended by 
Reg FD, other effects were observed. This included a higher variation of analyst opinions, each 
interpreting publicly disclosed information differently resulting in a total increase in trading volume 
right after the introduction (Bailey et al., 2003). In addition, Bailey et al. (2003) found that 
companies voluntarily disclosed more information for short-time earnings causing these forecasts to 
be stable. However, long term earnings forecasts diverted, clearly indicating analysts’ difficulty to 
assess company disclosed information ex-post Reg FD.27 Lastly, Kadan et al. (2009) report that 
many investment banks adopted a three-tier recommendation rating system in contrast to the 
previous five-tier rating system indicating a more distinct signal to the investor. 
In order to prevent the occurrence of conflicts of interests, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange’s Regulatory Committee (NYSE) 
released Rule 2711 and Rule 472, respectively, in 2002. After the stock market crash in 2000-2001 
and an increased concern of biased stock market research, this aimed to provide regulatory rules for 
internal and external communication, personal trading and ownership, and analyst’s compensation. 
Today, it is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a private corporation overseen 
by SEC and a merger of NASD and NYSE, who continuously amends regulations to “protect 
investors by maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital markets.”28  
                                                          
 
27 See also Feldman (2010) for a comment on the results of 10 years implementation of Reg FD. 
28 Compare to FINRA rule manual (finra.complinet.com). 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 set a new standard for the accuracy of disclosed 
information by setting higher accountability and penalties for fraudulent behavior of the parties 
involved (e.g. public companies, their management and auditors). Additionally, it also aimed to 
tighten investors trust to analyst reports by defining a Code of Conduct for analyst behavior 
regarding conflict of interests. Furthermore, it demanded companies to disclose more information 
while insuring accuracy and continuous updating.  
The Global Settlement Act of April 2003 had the objective to further reduce analysts’ 
conflict of interest and advocate analysts’ integrity. Namely, this caused banks to separate their 
investment banking department from their research department whose interdependence influenced 
analysts’ research objectivity. Hence, this followed in banks implementing new policies to not only 
physically separate the two departments but also prevent internal information flow between the two 
departments to occur. This is known as the Chinese Wall (cp. Kadan et al. (2009)).    
Lastly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010 take 
effect on the financial market as consequence of the recent financial crisis. It sets new standards and 
reforms the whole financial market including the rights of investors and the influence of the 
Security and Exchange Commission (Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act 2010).  
 
2.2.2 Incentives for Biases 
 
Research analysts act as third party evaluator for the companies they are performing 
research on while potentially also providing or attracting banking services at the same time. 
Naturally, diverse conflicts of interests arise for the analyst, the affiliated bank and the company, all 
conflicting with the investors’ need for independent opinions on stocks’ and industries’ future 
performance (cp. APPENDIX C). Analysts and executives at companies are required to constantly 
balance their mutual dependency in order to maximize their individual benefit. Analysts rely on the 
good relationship to the company as information source while also representing the bank as a 
possible provider of banking services. Hence, the analyst is therefore stimulated to provide positive 
research reports to not upset board executives. On the contrary, the management board also faces 
similar incentives for maintaining a good connection to the bank (e.g. for good recommendations to 
raise money or good investment banking deal offers). One example of conflict of interest arises 
when the company uses their position (i.e. their insider information) to trigger sweetheart deals 
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from the bank. Clearly, there are generally several plausible strategies for which both actors can 
maximize their profits and be pareto efficient in their objective. However, other actors (e.g. 
investors or company stakeholders) may suffer from these allocations, which led the SEC to 
introduce new regulations and code of conducts in the past (e.g. Chinese Wall). Biases of market 
participants have been extensively studied by previous research. We will provide a concise 
overview and provide results of the recent findings. In particular, it is interesting to know if 
investors are aware of such biases and discount accordingly in their investment decisions. 
There are various incentives for the bank to consciously or unconsciously influence their 
analysts causing research reports to be biased. Multiple authors have found recommendation 
optimism (i.e. not only providing more positive recommendations but also being more reluctant for 
recommendation changes downwards) to be a resulting phenomenon of this influence. There are 
three possible reasons analyst recommendations and earnings forecast may show optimism. First, 
the bank may want to maintain or improve their relationship and trigger favorable treatment (e.g. 
access to conference calls) leading to reduced analyst costs (e.g. time) and, hence, to better 
recommendation (Libby et al., 2008). Libby et al. (2008) also shows that past regulatory 
interventions did not completely stop this conflict from occurring, however, Kadan et al. (2009) 
show that the frequency of optimistic recommendation declined while also becoming more 
informative. Second, the bank is motivated to generate trade in order to profit from commissions. 
Irvine (2001) shows evidence that a bank can significantly increase their trading volume by 
performing research and covering the stock. Jackson (2005a) then shows that optimism in analysts’ 
research further increases trading volume. Cowen et al. (2006) not only show that optimism does 
indeed drive income of trade commissions but also differentiate between the sources of income for 
the bank (e.g. trade commission or/and underwriting) to fund research (i.e. analyst compensation) 
and find that brokerage houses depending on trade commission show higher optimism than banks 
that perform both services (i.e. trading and underwriting). Irvine (2004) differentiates between 
optimism in recommendation or earnings forecast. His results confirm the correlation of 
recommendation optimism with future trade generation (either through buying or selling). Their 
research on forecasted earning, however, does not show any effects on trade. Third, banks 
interested in offering investment services to companies have implicit effects (i.e. optimism) on 
analysts’ research (e.g. Dugar and Nathan (1995); Lin and McNichols (1998); Hong and Kubik 
(2003)). In cases where banks compete for initial public offerings (IPO) analyst research is most 
often not being influenced prior to the IPO since this is the point where most banks initiate coverage 
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(Ljungqvist et al., 2006). However, winning underwriting mandates might trigger favorable 
recommendations by the bank ex-post the IPO as a sort of repayment for winning the deal. The 
same is true for all other equity or debt offerings for which a bank could possibly strongly advertise 
itself as underwriter already before or also after the offering by giving optimistic recommendation. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) confirm the bank’s optimism in recommending stocks for IPOs that 
have been taken out by them. Therefore, it is questionable if analysts’ recommendations should be 
audited or approved by departments or supervisors in a bank that are involved in such investment 
services (cp. SEC regulations / Chinese Wall). Ljungqvist et al. (2006) do not find significant 
evidence that bold recommendation influences the probability of winning such lead-management 
offerings at a future point. In a later study, however, Ljungqvist et al. (2009) show that optimism 
increases likelihood to receive co-management positions in security offerings instead. This is an 
important immediate step to a future security offering for the bank to become lead-manager because 
a relationship has already been established, and, therefore, chances of winning are higher. Shen and 
Chih (2009) point out another conflict of interest arising within a bank. Their observed stock 
sample shows abnormal returns, specifically, in the time window between seven days prior to and 
two days after the banks buy recommendation and negative for the days following. Hence, the 
banks that engage in selling their own stocks may have the chance to profit from their own 
recommendation. In addition to conforming to the optimism in analysts’ recommendation, the study 
also reveals that market participants do account for the optimism and are not being fooled.  
Agrawal and Chen (2005) summarize all the previously mentioned conflicts of interests with 
the investment banking division (but also the not mentioned M&A transactions) as well as 
brokerage, and develop a quantitative measure to control for the influence that analysts are facing. 
In addition to conform the optimism in analysts’ recommendation, the study also reveals that 
market participants account for the optimism so that investors are not being fooled.   
Sell-side analysts are in a multifaceted role serving multiple people and are not only prone 
to employer-related incentives. There are also various incentives that motivate the analyst 
individually to engage in optimism. First of all, analysts are being paid and rewarded by their 
employer and their corresponding income source (e.g. investment banking deals) which encourages 
the analyst implicitly for optimism (cp. Groysberg et al. (2011b)). There are only little incentives 
for the analyst to produce negative recommendation (cp. Mayew (2008); Westphal and Clement 
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(2008)) which is supported by the fact that only a relatively small fraction of outstanding 
recommendation are actually negative (i.e. sell recommendations) (Barber et al., 2006).29 In fact, 
analysts’ sell recommendation might penalize analysts’ reputation since they are not as frequent and 
more strongly perceived by the market (Womack, 1996). Jackson (2005a), however, found that 
analysts could be motivated to be accurate in their research in order to generate personal reputation 
(e.g. external rankings and surveys). This fact is critical since it might lead to a dilemma for the 
analyst contradicting with the bank’s objective. This is particularly true since analysts also hold 
positions of high responsibility with firms (Graham et al., 2002). Hong and Kubik (2003) also 
found that analysts are being rewarded for accurate forecasting in finding better future employment. 
Nevertheless, the study revealed also that analyst experienced such rewards based on their optimism 
as well. Westphal and Clement (2008) show that the social influence by the covered firm is relevant 
for the recommendation course. Companies’ management has incentives and means (e.g. support 
the analyst in networking) to influence the analyst. The study shows that analysts react positively 
(i.e. optimism) to courtesies made by management and that negative recommendations by the 
analyst cause management’s reluctance. The later has also been shown by Mayew (2008), who 
observed a decrease in information access through management. Management’s punishment 
towards the analyst alarms other analysts, and reduces their likelihood of downgrading the company 
(Westphal and Clement, 2008). 
Generally, an analyst might also divert the attention unevenly to only selected parts of his 
portfolio. It is reasonable to think that an analyst uses extra care in research for customer-related 
stocks. For example, a bank might put its own money at risk handing out problematic research to a 
bank’s lender-affiliated stock. Ergungor (2011) found that banks do show more accurate earnings 
forecast for lender-affiliated stocks, which can be derived by the additional insights that the bank 
gets after establishing the lending agreement. However, the authors found that optimism in stock 
recommendations and growth continues to exist.  
All in all, research has found different settings where analyst biases are likely to appear. As 
shown earlier, the process of forming research reports is a complex sequence of known information 
combined with multiple assumptions. The latter can easily be amended to change the research into a 
different direction (Hough, 2012). The banks’ influence and the absence of regulations might not be 
the only factors leading to the occurrence of biases. Analysts are choosing the portfolio of firms that 
                                                          
 
29 This is partly due to the fact that market has a tendency to go up as argued by Valentine (2011). 
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they are covering, so optimism might arise naturally for the favored firms or might simply be the 
result of human error (poor judgment in the evaluation process).  
After all, as indicated by Cowen et al. (2006) and other studies, successful banks might be 
motivated to refrain from too much optimism to prevent a downgrade of their reputation and 
customer’s trust. In the next section we will discuss the relevance and value of stock research as an 
essential foundation for our study.  
 
2.2.3 The Investment Value of Stock Research  
In 2.1.2 we identified information sources and analyst skills that drive analysts’ reports. The 
following section will now discuss the question of the investment value of their reports and 
elaborate on the scientific evidence found in the literature. One could think that analysts only 
reproduce many of the public capital market information (e.g. quarterly reports) which, in fact, has 
already been incorporated in the stock price. In addition to this supposedly low value adding, the 
biases we reviewed in the previous section may contribute to the distortion of analysts’ research 
insights. Therefore, it is legitimate to question if recommendation, earnings forecasts, and price 
targets add any investment value to the publicly available information on the capital market or if 
their research is too ambiguous for any practical use. However, the decisive factors for the valuation 
of a company requires adjustments to the available fundamental firm data (e.g. earnings forecasts 
for DCF use) and also incorporate many uncertain non-quantitative data (e.g. management 
information) that represent non-manifestly readable numbers (e.g. future market trends or capital 
market behavior). Such uncertain input values for models compromise the value of the analysts’ 
research additionally and raises doubt on its quality again.  
Much of academic research focused on the use of analyst research reports or past-
performance stock characteristics to find indicators or strategies in order predict the best stock 
investment at a given point in time. For example, Lakonishok et al. (1993), looking at past-
performance stock performance of over two decades ago, show that the strategic investment in 
value stocks30 can outperform the strategy in building portfolio investments of glamour stocks. The 
reason is market participants’ entrenched overestimation of glamor stock growth rates relative to 
                                                          
 
30 Value investing has been proposed by Benjamin Graham & David Dodd (1934) (Graham and Dodd, 2009). For 
another reference example on value-investing refer to Klarman (1991).  
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value stocks in addition to the higher risk that glamor stock bear. Several other studies looked at the 
use of analyst research as a source of information for profitability of trading. Stickel (1995) finds 
that analysts’ stock research does affect the stock prices (i.e. the stock is mispriced) in a short and 
long-term perspective and, hence, that there is a pay-off in analysts’ work. Their results show that 
an analysts’ recommendation can have an average return as high as 4.61 percent in the period of [-
5; +5] days of the recommendation. Such price effects were observed for a certain analyst setting 
working with a large bank, a significant recommendation change to (strong) buy, a positive revision 
in an earnings forecast, a smaller company that is being recommended, and an analyst with a high 
reputation. This setting describes key determinants influencing short-term price reactions. Womack 
(1996) confirms the relevance of stock prices. First, his results show that stock prices change the 
following months, on average, by +5% and -11% for a recommendation change to buy or sell, 
respectively. Large returns have been found within a three day period of the recommendation and 
stay significant for excess returns the month after (change to buy) and six month after (change to 
sell). Nevertheless, the authors also found that there is a “considerable postrecommendation drift” 
describing the fact that market participants are changing their opinion, however, this was not based 
on new public information. This underlines the fact that, even though analysts’ research shifts a 
stocks’ price to its real value, the price is still not reflecting all information. Barber et al. (2001) 
again confirm such price effect but are taking a different approach by not looking at the average 
price influence of an analysts’ individual recommendation but rather at a whole investment 
portfolio. Their results also confirm the value that analysts create in their information collection and 
interpretation process. Their strategy of investing in the most favorable consensus recommendations 
with a continuous portfolio update yields an average annual abnormal gross return of 4.13 percent. 
In a later study, Barber et al. (2006) use the distribution of banks’ stock ratings as underlying source 
to analyze analyst recommendation profitability. In agreement with their hypothesis that 
conservative analysts with less frequent updates to a buy recommendation should be of higher value 
than those from optimistic analysts with relative more buy recommendation, the authors find that 
such information helps investors in their stock evaluation. However, these findings are based on 
market data prior to the implementation of NASD Rule 2711 in 2002, which required the disclosure 
of such recommendation distributions thereafter. The ex-post analysis of Rule 2711 revealed that 
the differences between the two types of analysts significantly shrank, indicating the success of the 
rule and the convergence of the analysts in their recommendation scale use. Gleason et al. (2012) 
further investigate the value of analysts’ price target and how the underlying valuation model used 
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by the analyst influence the investment value of their price target opinions. The author’s sixteen 
year stock sample confirms the analysts’ ability to predict future stock returns reflected in their 
price targets. Furthermore, the authors endorse the importance of choice of valuation methodology 
for maximizing investment prospects. As seen in Imam et al. (2008), the authors see in a 
fundamental residual stock valuation technique superior forecasts. Lin and McNichols (1998) study 
how a bank’s underwriting relationship to a company and the recommendation optimism that it 
causes will affect investors’ performance in the stock, compared to following the recommendation 
of an unaffiliated bank. The results of their data suggest, in spite of the optimism of affiliated banks, 
that there is no significant difference in expected return following either bank. However, investors 
see a more negative stock signal in hold recommendations of affiliated banks to those of their 
corresponding unaffiliated banks.   
All in all, we can assume that analysts’ research and recommendations are relevant by 
providing new information to the market as well as by their expertise in interpreting company and 
industry information. This is an important result of our literature review since it renders research on 
analysts’ biases more significant and meaningful. We assume that public information is made 
available to the capital market participants in a delayed fashion and, therefore, analysts’ research 
reduces information asymmetries and reveals additional value for market participants. Hence, we 
assume that the market is not entirely efficient31 and that not all information is incorporated into the 
stock price at a given point in time. Hence, it is only logic to assume that analysts’ acquired insights 
lose their value over time since information is spread by other sources, reaching all market 
participants. Other important results of our review include, first, that sell recommendations are 
more predicative than buy recommendations since the analyst faces more resistance in announcing 
negative recommendations (e.g. Asquith et al. (2005) or Frankel et al. (2006)). Second, stock prices 
develop towards the change of recommendation, but only for a short amount of time with the 
highest yield expected around the time of recommendation revision (e.g. Hough (2012)). Third, 
besides recommendation revisions, price target revisions are a significant stock performance 
indicator (Asquith et al., 2005). Fourth, analysts’ rationales for their research results have also been 
found to be of significant value for investors (Asquith et al., 2005). Lastly, besides investors’ 
benefit of the analysts’ expertise, covered companies benefit from increased capitalization. 
                                                          
 
31 The question if the capital market misprices assets has been discussed in literature controversially. This discussion 
includes the question if the analyst is able to uncover such stocks. If analyst only rely on non-proprietary information all 
information should already be incorporated in the current stock price.  
 
 
25 
 
Investors that are aware of known analyst biases (cp. 2.2.2.) may arbitrage at least part of 
incorporated inefficiencies for increased investment prospects.   
 
2.3 Network Effects and Economic Outcomes  
2.3.1 Social Network Theory 
Network science has advanced rapidly in the last two decades and continuous to grow at a 
fast pace (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). The formulation of the first research problem dates back to 
the 1950’s (cp. The small world problem (de Sola Pool and Kochen, 1978)) and is followed by the 
inclusion of research questions in various disciplines, such as computer science and sociology or in 
the context of mathematical graph theory for example.32 The common ground is the connection and 
interaction between different entities or actors forming a network. Most research so far analyzed its 
formation process in addition to characteristics and efficiency of the overall network33 but failed to 
a great extent investigating more insides in the maintenance and dissolution process of networks 
(Monge, 2001). For our review, we restrict ourselves to the context of social networks34 whose 
interest has increased nowadays even more due to the ease of maintaining friendships and 
professional contacts through advanced telecommunication and electronic resources like online 
networking and platforms (cp. Ellison et al. (2007)). The new multimedia application and the 
increased mobility of people change the traditional picture of social networks (cp. Mesch and 
Talmud (2006); Stegbauer (2010)). We usually find interpersonal ties to be poorly documented and 
most often only see certain settings captured. Examples of the evolution of traceable social ties are 
often activity and membership related (e.g. Fracassi (2012) who categorizes ties in “Past 
Employment Network”, “Education Network” and “Other Activities Network”) or originate from 
electronic sources or applications (cp. Ankolekar et al. (2009)). However, privacy requirements 
often limited the access of such data for research35 and, hence, survey-based approaches as well as 
                                                          
 
32 Relevant network science research is currently undertaken for example in the context of epedimics, terrorism, social 
mobility, power grids or neural and genetic networks. See Watts (2003) as a reference for further insights into the field 
of network science. 
33 See Jackson (2005b) for more information on the formal modeling and its context in different fields.  
34 See Scott (1988) for early research developments of social networks. 
35 Sample data released from telecommunication companies and online platforms is increasing becoming available 
promising enormous research opportunities (Birke, 2009). 
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publicly available biography (bio) data had been the traditional approach to identify social 
networks.  
We first focus on the key findings of network theory and the contribution by sociology 
before we review social ties in different contexts to demonstrate its power and the benefits for 
participants, highlighting relevant research in the banking and management board context.36 Social 
network theory has found five distinctive structural commonalities between networks.37 These 
structural properties help to understand how networks typically evolve and how people are 
interconnected on micro and macro levels. First, the famous experimental study (Small World 
Problem) of Travers and Milgram (1969) showed that the median number of intermediaries or 
friendships between two individuals (vertex) has a diameter as small as 6 steps (six degrees of 
separation).38 Second, analyses of social networks have shown that the number of acquaintances of 
people follow a “heavy tail” distribution (also known as power-law distribution) supporting the idea 
of hubs in social structures. That is, the number of network connection for most people is within a 
similar range, whereas there are also few individuals with a significantly higher degree of 
connectivity that serve as a hub for the network (e.g. Freeman (1978); Dodds et al. (2003); Jackson 
and Rogers (2007)). Third, several studies have found that social networks have a high tendency of 
connecting people with similar attributes (HOMOPHILY) (e.g. McPherson et al. (2001); Jackson and 
Rogers (2007)).39 Fourth, similar people not only connect with each other, but also have other 
common friends that both are connected to. Therefore, the two friends of a friend are very likely to 
be friends again (TRANSITIVITY) (e.g. Watts (1999); de Sola Pool and Kochen (1978); Granovetter 
(1983)). This increases the tendency to form separate networks with more dense ties compared to 
ties outside the network (CLUSTERING) (e.g. Mishra et al. (2007); Krivitsky et al. (2009)). Lastly, 
social networks have a tendency to either form reciprocal relationships or none at all. Friendship 
reciprocity between two persons describes, once one person claims to be friends with the other, the 
likelihood that the other person is also confirming this friendship tie. In the context of our study, 
reciprocity between banks and industry describes the fact that once a link between a bank and a 
                                                          
 
36 Review Brass et al. (2004) and Monge (2001) for a more detailed theory in communication networks in 
organizations. 
37 This trend is particularly true and has been observed in larger networks on macroscopic level. 
38 Several more recent studies supports the experiment with very similar results for the same experiment but the same 
setting (cp. Dodds et al. (2003); Backstrom et al. (2012)). 
39 “HOMOPHILY is the principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar 
people” (McPherson et al., 2001). 
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management board is created (i.e. a banker switching employment), the likelihood increases for 
mutual information transfer between bank and management board (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010). 
Network Centrality Theory describes different methods in order to distinguish networks’ 
members based on its network position and, therefore, is able to infer their significance regarding 
different attributes. This is known in literature as the concept of centrality40 based on the 
approaches of closeness, degree, betweenness or eigenvector41 whereas the former is most 
important for the acquisition of information. A network member that is, on average, closer to all 
other members than everyone else has an advantage in acquiring information and has increased 
chances of getting unaltered information from the information sources based on fewer intermediary 
network members. This has been confirmed by Sorenson et al. (2006) who find that socially closer 
actors can profit over distant actors for information that is of “moderate complexity.” By weighing 
ties and neighbors (cp. eigenvector centrality) it is possible to also account for the quality of 
neighbors (cp. Freeman (1978); Opsahl et al. (2010)).  
The distinction between STRONG TIES and WEAK TIES has been important in research 
regarding information transfer within networks. Measuring the strength of a two-way tie is 
challenging because it mutually differs and depends on many continuously-changing factors. 
Granovetter (1973) define “the ‘strength’ of an interpersonal tie” as a “probably linear” function 
“of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.” Mesch and Talmud (2006) confirm the importance of the 
duration of a relationship and add additional drivers (e.g. “shared social actions”) underlining the 
importance of social similarity. Another definition of strength proposed by Granovetter (1973) does 
not look directly at the tie itself, but implicitly concludes its strength. This is based on the number 
of common network ties that both friends share.  One might think that STRONG TIES, the people that 
we most frequently connect to, are the most important for information acquirement. However, 
following the argumentation of Granovetter (1983), it becomes clear why this is most often not the 
case. As stated earlier, STRONG TIES are usually found within clusters of densely-tied people, 
whereas weak ties are mostly found directing to people in other networks or clusters, with each of 
these ties being unknown to each other. Granovetter points out that new information is not acquired 
within the cluster but rather from the outside. Therefore, WEAK TIES are significant as a “crucial 
                                                          
 
40 Several authors have introduced different measures in literature for each category.  
41 Eigenvector is a special form of closeness accounting for the quality of neighbors (cp. page ranking algorithms).  
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bridge” to other clusters or networks (cp. job search example in Granovetter (1973); Granovetter 
(1983); Dodds et al. (2003)). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) give an excellent overview of social 
capital theory and provide three crucial dimensions for the creation of intellectual capital:  
(A) Structural Dimension (Network Ties, Network Configuration, Appropriable organization) 
(B) Cognitive Dimension (Shared Codes and Language, Shared Narratives) 
(C) Relational Dimension (Trust, Norms, Obligations, and Identification) 
The knowledge that people are expecting to find by consulting others has been studied by Cross et 
al. (2001) and was categorized as information leading to: 
 (1) Solutions, (2) Meta-knowledge, (3) Problem Reformulation, (4) Validation, (5) Legitimation.  
Their network analysis suggests that people choose different people from their portfolio for 
the different kinds of information they are seeking. This contact is then being chosen based on the 
characteristics of the relationship rather than the formal status or the expertise.  
 
2.3.2 Significance of Social Network Ties 
In recent years, several authors have studied the value of social network connections in 
different contexts identifying significant effects on personal rewards or penalties, firm performance, 
deal terms and conditions as well as the general actor’s biases caused by the social network. Based 
on his previous findings, Granovetter (2005) provides an excellent overview of the sociologist 
contribution to this discussion and its impact on economic outcomes. We exemplarily look at some 
of the most recent research results in different contexts to show the relevance and impact of social 
ties.   
The debate of shareholder rights and corporate governance provided incentives for research 
for further investigation of the relationship between the board of directors, the CEO, and outside 
members confirming the influence of social ties on corporate governance. Three recent studies 
looked at the impact of social ties between the board of directors and the firm’s CEO.  First, 
Nguyen (2011) shows that poor performance of connected CEOs are more tolerated than for the 
independent CEOs. And if a CEO change has been put through, a connected CEO is more likely to 
find a good replacement for his lost position. Second, Fracassi and Tate (2012) related connected 
CEO’s to more frequent acquisitions and, on average, diminishing shareholder value. In addition, 
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such influential CEOs tend to choose new directors who already show a common existing network 
connection. Third, by introducing their own measure of social strength Hwang and Kim (2009) 
underline that social ties must be seen as an additional dimension to conventional interlocks of 
directors to a CEO. Their findings also suggest that social ties have an impact on the effectiveness 
of board monitoring with consequences on compensation of CEO performance evaluation. The 
results of Andres and Lehmann (2011) suggest that highly connected directors (i.e. busy board 
members with several board appointments) have a negative impact on the monitoring in firms 
which follows in higher compensation and worse firm performance. This is consistent with the 
results of Horton et al. (2012), however, their interpretation of higher compensation is a reward for 
bringing the firm into a more central position rather than a “rent extraction by executives.” In 
contrast to other studies (e.g. Andres and Lehmann (2011)), their results suggest that board 
connections are not necessary but rather improve their company performance. 
Social connections not only affect corporate governance but also affect managers’ decisions 
directly. Fracassi (2012) provides evidence that corporate finance decision-making in large 
companies is influenced by their network connections by showing a reduced diversity of corporate 
finance policies between two companies when sharing increasingly network connections. This is 
due to the fact that connected executives between firms can easily exchange information and, 
therefore, their decision-making converges. In addition, the authors confirm the importance of 
central network positions for a company (i.e. they are socially more connected) leading to an 
economic payoff and a competitive advantage.  
Hochberg et al. (2007) provide another interesting context where the impacts of social 
connections have been studied. Based on network centrality measures, the study shows that 
investment funds of connected venture capital firms outperform their less connected peers while 
also having a higher probability of seeing through their companies in their portfolio for future 
investments. The authors credit the improved performance to value adding in the form of venture 
capital syndicates providing additional resources (e.g. information or research) or access to other 
partners (e.g. investment banks), which highlight the importance of network connections and 
centrality. 
In the context of network connection to banks, we would like to highlight several studies 
relating to some aspects of our study. Mizruchi and Stearns (2001) focus on decision-making within 
banks and analyze what types of networks bankers construct. Their results suggest that bankers rely, 
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facing risky deals, on few close network ties for which trust has been established rather than 
consulting multiple coworkers with only a weak connection. In a later study, Mizruchi et al. (2011) 
focus on the incentives for bankers to construct networks and concludes with two types of networks 
that are being constructed, each proven to be rewarding, however, for two different purposes. The 
first type aims to build both diverse and strong ties to coworkers leading to a portfolio of 
trustworthy information sources, which is then being rewarded based on a better individual 
performance. The second type suggests forming a densely-connected network to actors of higher 
hierarchy provoking favorable performance assessments apart from objective measures. Their 
authors work suggests that neither of the two social network types alone will automatically lead to 
personal success of the banker, but the combination of the two promise better performance and 
personal career advantages. Berger et al. (2011) study how social network connections in banks 
influences the appointment of new executives and find that similarity in age and gender to existing 
executives and “better embeddedness in the social system of the bank” increases chances to be 
appointed as outside applicant. Pre-existing social ties as well as better network connections 
(measured by the authors as applicant from a larger institution) have the similar effects for the 
applicant underlining the power of HOMOPHILY and the significance of network connections as a 
vital social capital.  
Fleischer (2011) takes a more network theory related approach and analyze joint stock 
coverage ties of analysts extracted from Thomson’s IBES database. Their finding documents two 
fundamental changes of network effects that came with the introduction of Reg FD. First, whereas 
analysts could profit from an advantage of network effects in the form of superior information in a 
central analyst co-coverage network position (closeness centrality) prior to Reg FD, this effect 
diluted, measured by the analyst’s earnings estimates and their likelihood of being risky, after Reg 
FD was introduced and information was mandated to flow publicly. Second, in the selective 
information disclosure network prior to Reg FD, multi-market analysts made use of the selective 
information on-hand for estimates standing-out from others, not participating in mutual 
forbearance.42 Since Reg FD caused the circulation of the same public available information in the 
analyst network and, hence, the individual superior information foundation for risky estimates has 
                                                          
 
42 Mutual forbearance is the phenomena of actors’ decreased competitive behavior towards each other actors when 
competing in different markets together. This stands in contrast to single market competitor for which no forbearance is 
observed.   
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been diminished, analysts prefer to commit to mutual forbearance with their peers after Reg FD 
(Fleischer, 2011). 
 
2.3.3 Most Related Previous Research 
We are focusing on interpersonal ties between banks and management boards and want to analyze 
the effects of the network positions in this setting on analyst recommendations, investment services, 
and other areas (cp. Research Outlook). Limited amount of research has been carried out in this 
context, and we have few sources of previous research relating to our area of study.  
First, Engelberg et al. (2012) analyze lending agreement outcomes and the potential harm of 
the bank’s shareholder caused by the relationship. The data was extracted from BoardEx and 
custom data from Management Diagnostic Limited combining firm executive bio data with those 
from commercial banks. This resulted in a database identifying interpersonal linkages based on 
“school” and “third-party past professional connections.” Their results confirm that connected 
firms are “associated with substantially lower interest rates, fewer covenants, and larger loan 
amounts.” In addition, their research shows that the company continues to benefit over the lifetime 
of the relationship by better credit ratings and improved stock returns. Following intuition, the 
authors point out that the utility of the personal relationship peaks for “critical companies”, firms 
for which banks’ risks are higher and insights into the firm are most valuable in evaluating 
creditworthiness. Counter-intuitively, the study finds that the favorable behavior also results in 
better company performance concluding that such network ties may improve monitoring and 
information flow. 
Second, the study of Brochet (2011) underlines the significance of social networks between 
analysts and executives of companies which they cover. Their study reveals that this network tie is 
indeed important for their company coverage decision, based on the fact that analysts have a 
tendency to change company coverage when executives travel to a different company. This effect 
has been particularly observed for executive job changes in the same industry. Even more 
interesting is the fact that, first, analysts that follow executives “exhibit more intense and accurate 
coverage” compared to their peers and their residual stock coverage and, second, the 
implementation of Reg FD does not show any consequences on the author’s results. Both results 
indicate to either an excellent analyst knowledge or judgment about the executive’s performance 
and decision making or point towards a close network tie which allows excellent performance.    
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       Third, Cohen et al. (2010) identify sell-side school ties between senior management and sell-
side analysts and find that analysts with an alumni connection outperform their peers based on their 
recommendations. This result was significant before the implementation of Reg FD but not 
afterwards. Furthermore, the authors show that the number of school-ties that an analyst has in 
place does influence the probability of becoming an All-Star analyst. Both results show the value of 
social network connections for the sell-side analyst.   
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS 
3.1. Context and Objective  
As seen in our introduction, information access is the foundation and a key driver for analyst 
research. Analytical tools are widely available and research has focused on highlighting strengths 
and weaknesses. Therefore, analysts share a common platform and set of analytical tools (e.g. 
fundamental analysis or valuation methods) whereas input parameters of these tools differentiate 
analysts from each other. Assessing these factors is critical for the modeling of a stock. Analysts 
with different information on-hand may estimate timing and magnitude of key factors differently 
and, therefore, assign different weights to different information (cp. Chen and Jiang (2006)), which 
then leads to different outcomes. Diligent working analysts generally can reach out to the same 
public information since SEC adopted Regulation FD promising that information are fairly 
disclosed and selective information release generally is restricted. Hence, it should be the analyst’s 
skillset, knowledge of the particular industry as well as selection of information sources that makes 
the analyst stand-out. 
Proprietary information, however, is an additional driver and has the potential to turn around 
analysts’ research by providing insights that can change the prospects of a company (e.g. successful 
medicament research for a pharmaceutical company or an upcoming acquisition of a competitor).43 
This is particularly true for our highly globalized and competitive economy, which is changing at a 
high pace. After all, it is the early information that deviates from the consensus and the market 
knowledge that makes recommendations very valuable.44 Seeking proprietary information is useful 
for various reasons. First, such information is acquired before it possibly reaches the market. 
Getting the information early will provide the analyst with a timely advantage which will help them 
stand-out from the crowd, supporting personal and professional success, and reputation. Second, the 
                                                          
 
43 E.g. investors in growth stocks would like to know when the stock is approaching the peak. Hence, analysts’ 
information about critical factors driving the stock will further approximate stock forecasts.  
44 Compare to the notion of bold estimates in Fleischer (2011). 
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analyst may be able to access more information45 or selectively choose information that is needed in 
the research process. Third, proprietary information may very often have the benefit of being of 
higher quality than other sources. Lastly, analysts may be able to verify their key assumptions in 
their report and make their research more robust and meaningful (cp. Cross et al. (2001)). All in all, 
proprietary information of any kind will lead to a comparative advantage over analysts that base 
their research only on public information and therefore have a higher cost of some form (e.g. longer 
research process). Hence, various incentives are given to establish, make use of, and maintain such 
information channels. 
From our literature review it is apparent that a lot of research of sell-side analysts focused on 
the wide range of biases that analysts are exposed to and the analysis of identifying reports that 
bring most information to the market at a given point in time (e.g. change or revision of 
recommendation). This extensive research is the logical consequence of investors’ need to 
understand the value of research reports to identify their best investment. We would like to 
contribute to this discussion by taking social networks into consideration. The ability to model such 
social networks is, as mentioned earlier, often limited based on the availability of data. Our research 
focuses on a setting that allows extracting and filtering data describing social network connections 
between banks and the management board of U.S. traded companies, which we use as proxy for 
social ties. As other authors, we refer to such a setting as BANKERS ON THE BOARD or BANKING TIE 
(cp. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) or Dittmann et al. (2010)).46  
The foundation of our study relies on this BANKING TIE NETWORK and, more specifically, on 
the interpersonal affiliation of a board member to a bank which also provides analyst 
recommendation to the corresponding company. As we shall see later, we empirically identify a 
large set of board members on publicly traded companies with a social network to such a bank. 
Although job changes from the banking sector to the board of an industrial company is not 
necessarily logically connected at first glance, there are good reasons why companies decide to do 
so. The financial expertise of bankers, customer experience, knowledge, and networks within 
different industries is the right foundation to be able to make and drive strategic decisions. Research 
                                                          
 
45 As described in Valentine (2011) we agree that an analyst has to prioritize and won’t be able to incorporate all 
information due to timely constraints. Cross et al. (2001) underline that such meta-information “increases (…) 
efficiency in responding to problems.”    
46 We will often refer to this setting simply as a banking or social tie.  
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Analyst Stuart Jeffrey brings it to the point in his job description and the questions of movements in 
the career of a research analyst: 
“You understand the company, you understand to communicate with senior management (…), it is 
quite an easy step to go from one of the companies that you cover to then go and work for them. An 
easy step is that each of these companies then has a customer relations department and that is the 
point of contact for any investor or Analyst, and many of those roles are then filled with Analysts, 
who then if they do well, move on to more strategic roles within that company” (Jeffrey, 2009). 
To clarify our setting we describe our research context (Cohen et al., 2010). Bob’s 
performance at bank X refers him to be elected to serve on the board of company Y (while giving 
up or continuously keeping all position at bank X). Bob has been working at bank X for many years 
serving in multiple management positions, which have helped him to create a professional and 
social network to numerous departments and subsidiaries within the bank. Edgar and Alice are sell-
side analysts performing research on large cap companies including company Y. Both follow 
management conference calls and new market information closely for handing out the most 
accurate recommendation possible. Company Y recently pushed investments in research for 
optimizing its inventory and stochastic supply lead times allowing to reduce procurement and safety 
stock costs and, hence, increase efficiency and margins significantly. Edgar works for bank X as 
well and shares a banking tie and social network with Bob. Edgar is pushing his research and 
consults his network for insights. He receives information indicating the newly improved prospects. 
Alice, however, who is working for another bank, does not yet have access to this new information 
and is reiterating her recommendation whereas Bob is updating his recommendation to ‘buy’. In the 
next quarterly statement, Y is incorporating the new expected cost savings in companies earnings 
forecast which let the stock rise. The significantly improved prospects lets Alice update her 
recommendation only after the stock had already risen considerably and the new information has 
already been incorporated into the stock price. 
There are several plausible scenarios how information gets transmitted through a common 
social network. First of all, the banking research department might still be directly linked to the 
former employee (as the above example describes). Such a strong tie or two-way interaction could 
be kept for example through continuous banking services, close friendship, or ongoing common 
social events. Secondly, insights could also flow through an intermediate network member 
connecting both parties indirectly. Valentine (2011) provides a good example for such a situation:  
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“Don’t dismiss any contact as too insignificant. I made a contact with a frontline employee during 
a tour of the Port of Los Angeles who later was very helpful in confirming port congestion 
problems, which I used to help support a big stock call for the railroads that haul the containers 
from the port.” 
For cases, in which a direct contact between analyst and board member has been lost or has 
never been established, the common social network stimulates the analyst to retroactively connect 
to the banking tie either directly or through an intermediate close network member (e.g. through 
online networking tools (Ellison et al., 2007)). Local search in the close network promises to 
provide insights (cp. Sorenson et al. (2006)).  
Reg FD requires the fair and public disclosure of information; however, we think that social 
or banking ties have the potential to bypass such regulation based on the close relationship and the 
common network and previous experience. Reg FD may have indeed strengthened such 
unconventional information channels while counter-intuitively also strengthening traditional 
information sources (e.g. Investor Relations Department (Kirk and Vincent, 2011)). In the 
following section, we will state our hypotheses prior to describing our methodology for creating a 
new database of banking ties. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis 
Much of previous research studied social network ties and their effects using data based on 
alumni ties (e.g. Cohen et al. (2008); Cohen et al. (2010); Cohen (2010); Ellison et al. (2007)47), 
joint stock coverage (e.g. Zuckerman (2004); Fleischer (2011)), director and analyst interlocks 
(Horton (2010); Horton et al. (2010); Horton et al. (2012)), stock coverage change (e.g. Brochet 
(2011)) or mix of social connections48 (e.g. Hwang and Kim (2009)49; Berger et al. (2011); 
Engelberg et al. (2012); Fracassi and Tate (2012); Fracassi (2012)). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, the way in which a bank’s relationship and connection to a company can influence its 
recommendations towards this firm has not been fully discussed yet. More specifically, we seek to 
                                                          
 
47 In the context of Facebook friends. 
48 This includes similar or common past employment settings. 
49 Hwang and Kim (2009) for example propose a measure based not only on HOMOPHILY (e.g. education) but also on 
confounding (e.g. regional origin) as indicator for a social network distance. 
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characterize if a connection between a bank and a firm remains in cases where bankers change their 
employer and become members of a board of a company for which its former employer issues stock 
recommendations (Banking Tie without Having a Banker on the Board). The thesis’ goal is to 
empirically investigate whether the relationships to former managers are kept or resumed after the 
job change and whether consequently biases the bank’s analysts’ recommendation compared to the 
consensus. This specific context has only been attempted by Cohen et al. (2010) based on alumni 
network connections. The influence and impact of BANKING TIES to the company (i.e. the mutual 
return premium), therefore, still remain unanswered to a large extent.  
 
Hypothesis: 
It is hypothesized that a bank affiliated board member which has a tie to his old employer 
remaining in form of a social network triggers a conflict of interest and creates an agency problem. 
Namely, the analyst may gain access to superior information than publicly available on the market. 
Therefore, this banking tie is a value driver and translates to a comparable advantage for stock 
research. Furthermore, the network effects might have strong implication on banking investment 
service deals and the corporate governance debate.  
 
The banking tie dataset differs from a tradition relationship dataset. The number of 
acquaintances that is implied by a banking tie is much larger than the one implied by a two-node 
relationship. If we take the example of an alumni tie between management board and the bank, we 
can easily see the connection between both actors for which both might use the connection for a 
mutual benefit (e.g. closing a banking deal and cheaper lending). This might lead to an agreement 
for which both parties profit. However, the board member only has limited influence (only his one 
relationship) on the favorable outcome of the deal. With a banking tie, on the other hand, the board 
member has a higher number of network connections (e.g. to higher management and to different 
departments) to the bank and therefore higher leverage not only to get a favorable banking deal, but 
also to promote his interests inside the bank. On the contrary, any bank employee has a direct or 
very short network distance to the company’s board. This is underlined by the quote of Valentine 
(2011): 
“If you could build a mosaic by speaking with four colleagues in your network or learn about a new 
concept by reading the Wall Street Journal, which is more likely to help generate alpha?”  
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For the setting of a bank and a company that consists of two separate networks with one or 
more hubs connecting and interlocking both networks, we expect the network distance to be very 
small. Based on the close relationship, the distance could either be direct (no intermediaries) or very 
short (one or two intermediaries). In reality, it is part of an analyst’s job to network within and 
outside the company. The same is true for the new board member who in most of the cases 
automatically created a large network working his way up to a board member position. Therefore, 
we expect the degrees of freedom (the number of direct contacts) for both to be very high and 
therefore act as a hub or connector, increasing the chance for a direct connection between both 
vertexes. This notion is supported by the study of McPherson et al. (2001), who discuss networks in 
the context of HOMOPHILY. The authors argue that people with similar backgrounds have a higher 
probability to relate than others. This indicates that banking ties do not solely rely on a (previous) 
common employment at a bank, but might rather be reinforced or easy to reactivate based on other 
similar backgrounds. In the employment context, these factors are in particular similar backgrounds 
in education, occupation, and organizational structural position that underline the build-up of strong 
network ties.  
Previous research has shown that network connections allow direct information flow (e.g. 
Gintschel and Markov (2004); Cohen et al. (2010)) between analyst and companies’ management. 
Our research is therefore relevant for further insights into the financial market, how analysts 
perform their research and the effects after the implementation of Reg FD. It contributes to the 
literature of social network ties, bank biases, investor and shareholder rights, and the information 
value of analysts’ research report.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Sample Selection 
For our analysis, we selected a large set of companies to allow us to find a significant large 
sample of connections between company boards to a bank. The companies we selected are 
representing the most relevant stocks traded on the U.S. stock market. This includes the Dow Jones 
Composite Average (prominent companies), NASDAQ Composite (technology and growth 
companies), S&P 500 (large-cap companies), S&P 1000 (small and mid-cap companies). For these 
companies, we extracted all board executives (prior or current appointments) listed in Capital IQ’s 
database (cp. APPENDIX F). We assume that persons holding executive positions in a company’s 
board have the relevant expertise and influential power inside the firm to be of significant 
importance as a network connection to a bank. Also, we expect bankers that take on industry 
executive board positions directly or via intermediate positions in the firm, to have had a relevant 
position at the bank that recommended them for the new job position (cp. APPENDIX G). We also 
expect these individuals to have professional and social networks over several departments and 
subsidiaries to the old employer. We assume that direct or very short distance network connections 
will increase the likelihood for the banking tie to stay active, to be reactivated, or to be established 
to initiate information exchange when needed (e.g. stock analyst contacts board member for 
information retrieval).   
For each identified board member, the S&P Capital IQ database provided us with the 
following important information (each in a separate column in Microsoft Excel):  
(1) Board Member Name 
(2) Company Name  
(3) Board Job Function Title  
(4) Other Board Members (only current) 
(5) Bank Names and Analysts that cover the company  
(6) All Company Affiliation (prior or current appointments) 
(7) All Board Memberships (prior or current appointments) 
(8) Board Member’s Biography 
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In the following we would like to provide a prominent example to illustrate the information 
that we worked with. We present the information in the same order as the above mentioned 
categories: 
 
(1) “Gates, William Henry (Board)” 
(2) “Microsoft Corporation (NasdaqGS:MSFT)” 
(3) “Member of the Board of Directors; Chairman of the Board.” 
(4) “Gates, William Henry (Board); Ballmer, Steven A. (Board); Dublon, Dina (Board); 
Gilmartin, Raymond V. (Board); Marquardt, David F. (Board); Noski, Charles H. (Board); 
Panke, Helmut (Board); Hastings, Reed (Board); Klawe, Maria M. (Board).” 
(5) “Arete Research Services LLP (Shepherd, Adam: May-12-2011); Argus Research Company 
(Bonner, Joseph F.: Sep-03-2009); Ascendere Associates LLC (Castellano, J. Stephen: 
May-18-2011); Atlantic Equities LLP (Hickey, Christopher: Apr-23-2010); Axia Financial 
Research (Spagna, Fabrizio: Jun-29-2010); Barclays Capital, Research Division 
(Hernandez, Israel: Feb-16-2010); BofA Merrill Lynch, Research Division (Rangan, Kash 
G.: Apr-15-2010); (…).” 
(6) “Corbis Corporation (Board); Microsoft Corporation (NasdaqGS:MSFT) (Board); 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:BRK.A) (Board); Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
(Board); Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Asset Trust (Board); ICOS Corporation (Prior 
Board).” 
(7) “Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:BRK.A); Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation Asset Trust; Corbis Corporation; Microsoft Corporation 
(NasdaqGS:MSFT); ICOS Corporation (Prior).” 
(8) “Mr. William Henry Gates, III is the Co-Founder and Chairman of Microsoft Corp. He co-
founded the firm in 1975 and was appointed as the Chairman of the firm in 1981. Mr. Gates 
served as its Chief Software Architect from January 2000 to June 2006 and as the Chief 
Executive Officer of Microsoft Corp., from 1981 to January 2000. His foresight and his 
vision for personal computing have been central to the success of Microsoft corp. and the 
software industry and under his leadership; (…). Mr. Gates has been a Member of the 
Board of Directors of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., since December 14, 2004. He served as 
Director of ICOS Corp., from July 1990 to February 2005 (…).” 
 
The Excel dataset retrieved from S&P Capital IQ included 55724 such data entries representing 
33206 current and 21766 prior board members of 3560 individual companies (cp. Table 1).   
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Criteria Quantity 
Current Board Members 33206 
Prior Board Members 21766 
Prior Board, Deceased 551 
Not categorized 201 
Companies with no analyst coverage 9275 
Number of individual companies 3560 
Total Number banks providing 
recommendations 347 
Table 1 – Capital IQ Dataset Statistic (Data retrieved: June 2011) 
 
4.2. Methodology and Implementation Steps 
In order to identify a current board member as a banking tie, our dataset allowed us to 
search for indications in two of the categories: (1) All Company Affiliation (2) Board Member’s 
Biography. The former includes listed entries of all prior and current board members’ company 
affiliations. The biography is a short full written text as typically found in annual reports or other 
official company disclosures. Unfortunately, the two categories are not always consistent and, 
hence, most often include different information about employment history. Therefore, we looked at 
both categories to find prior employment indication. For biographies it is inherently difficult to scan 
for information (cp. APPENDIX B) due to its lack of categorization and spelling differences (e.g. 
full company name or only abbreviation). Hence, a programming algorithm to filter results is to be 
viewed critically since it is limited to scan the information (certain Words or Strings) and 
particularly is not able to evaluate biographical content.    
Company networks are closely intertwined and we can assume that bankers are not only 
creating a banking tie when switching directly from the bank (parent company) into the industrial 
position, but also when switching from banks’ subsidiaries into the board position. Hence, we 
complemented the 347 banks providing the recommendation to the 3560 companies with 
information of their current subsidiaries and operating units totaling to 28188 subsidiaries (cp. 
Figure 1). Intuitively, the largest banks also have the most subsidiaries.  
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Figure 1 – Number of Subsidiaries per Bank 
 
For the identification of banking ties, we manually filtered the 55724 entries for each of the 
banks handing out recommendations. This resulted in smaller datasets, which we then further 
narrowed down by searching for the corresponding bank name and its subsidiaries. Deutsche Bank 
AG, Research Division with its 699 subsidiaries, for example, narrowed down our original dataset 
to a number of PARTIAL RESULTS of 12279 board members. For each subsidiary name, we searched 
the All Company Affiliation and Biography column of the PARTIAL RESULTS and manually verified 
the results. For example, searching for Deutsche50 resulted in 129 board members when filtering in 
All Company Affiliation and 144 board members when filtering Biography column. We read 
through all the results and extracted the data entry if it was identified as a banking tie. 
   
Criteria Quantity 
Total number of PARTIAL RESULTS 459 073 
Total number of current subsidiaries 
and operating units 28188 
Table 2 – Capital IQ Filter Statistic 
                                                          
 
50 We typically shortened the search string from case to case to possibly not miss any results. Deutsche is often used as 
abbreviation for Deutsche Bank.   
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Results 
We have to point out the fact that our database is based on relationships and connections that 
have been established before they are likely to become relevant51 for agency problems or conflict of 
interests. This is advantageous for our upcoming research question for which we do not expect to 
account for correlation that would possibly occur when beneficial banking services agreements 
cause a personal relationship (i.e. endogenous, reverse banking tie). Hence, it is the banking tie that 
causes the conflict of interests and not the better terms of a banking deal that are creating this 
connection (i.e. exogenous banking tie).52 Nevertheless, we do not know the reasoning leading the 
banker to switch, but the creation of a banking tie seems to be unlikely. 
 
Criteria Quantity 
Current Board Members 1510 
Prior Board Members 1162 
Prior Board, Deceased 30 
Not categorized 13 
Total number of banking ties  2715 
Table 3 – BANKING TIE Results 
 
In our filtering process we identified 2715 banking ties (cp. Table 3) which consists of 1510 
current board members (as of June 2011) and 1162 board members that served the board prior to 
June 2011.  
                                                          
 
51 For connection where the banker simultaneously serves the board as well as the bank, banking would need to be 
evaluated on an individual basis to check if our assumption holds.  
52 Compare to discussions in Engelberg et al. (2012) and Brass et al. (2004). 
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We identified banking ties using the All Company Affiliation and Biography Column. Most 
of the banking ties we found provided indication for a tie in the Biography Column. About half of 
our banking ties provided indication for a banking tie in both categories (cp. Table 4). 
 
Criteria Quantity 
BANKING TIE info found in All Company Affiliation 1620 
BANKING TIE info found in Biography 2476 
BANKING TIE info found in All Company Affiliation and 
Biography 
1382 
 
BANKING TIE info only found in All Company Affiliation 236 
 
Total number of banking ties  2715 
Table 4 – BANKING TIE Info Distribution 
 
One very good example of a banking tie would be Dr. Eric Chen, board member of Varian 
Semiconductor Equipment Associates Inc. (NasdaqGS:VSEA). Varian Semiconductor receives 
recommendation from a total of 12 different analysts, including Christopher Blansett who is the 
analyst for JP Morgan Chase & Co, Research Division. Both categories provide an obvious signal 
for a banking tie (highlighted in boldface). For this particular banking tie, the bio information even 
reveals the board member’s history in the analyst department and profession: 
 
All Company Affiliation Column 
‘Silver Lake Partners; J.P. Morgan Partners, LLC (Prior); BofA Merrill Lynch (Prior); 
Brion Technologies Inc. (Board); Varian Semiconductor Equipment Associates Inc. 
(NasdaqGS:VSEA) (Board); JP Morgan Chase & Co, Research Division (Prior)’ 
 
Biography Column  
‘Dr. Eric Chen is a Managing Director at Silver Lake Partners. He has been at the firm 
since 2008 and is based in the Hong Kong office. (..) Prior to that, Dr. Chen was a Senior 
Vice President at J.P.Morgan, where he coordinated the global research effort in the 
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electronics sector and conducted equity research for a number of technology segments. 
Previously, he was a Senior Financial Analyst at Merrill Lynch Investment Bank. Dr. Chen 
served was a Senior Vice President at J.P. Morgan's global research effort in the overall 
electronics arena. During this time, Mr. Chen served as the Lead Research Analyst for the 
semiconductor and semiconductor equipment sectors and he advised J.P. Morgan's multi-
billion-dollar global investment arm for venture and private equity investments in the 
general semiconductor sector. His was also employed at Motorola (…)’ 
 
 
Figure 2 – Most Connected Banks53 
 
Figure 2 shows the banks in our dataset with most of the banking ties. It is striking that the 
most famous investment banks have the highest number of banking ties. Intuitively, one might think 
that the number of subsidiaries a bank has provides a strong indication for the number of banking 
ties to be found. However, if we compare the results of Figure 2 with the banks with the highest 
                                                          
 
53 Some of the research divisions belong to the same parent company (e.g. BHF-Bank Aktiengesellschaft and Deutsche 
Bank AG, Research Division; CA Cheuvreux, Research Division and CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, Research Division; 
IIFL Research and India Infoline Ltd, Research Division) for which this figure does not account for.  
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number of subsidiaries in Figure 1, we can see that this is not always the case. UniCredit Research 
and CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, Research Division and with 1191 and 646 subsidiaries, 
respectively, have each only one banking tie.  
 
Figure 3 provides an overview over the companies with prior or current board members 
connected to a bank. Not surprising, these are often prestigious banks for which job turnovers of 
bankers into better positions are expected. However, it is striking that most of the firms are big 
industrial corporations.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Most Connected Companies 
 
Lastly, we analyzed the board members and found that there are a significant number of 
executives with multiple prior or current board appointments that also form banking ties. Figure 4 
gives an overview over the most connected board members.  
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Figure 4 – Most Connected Board Members 
 
 
We propose to add the following columns to our banking tie database in order to achieve a 
better understanding of the characteristics of our banking ties and complement our database: 
(1) Relationship to research department (parent company or subsidiary?) 
(2) Position held in the bank (analyst?) 
(3) Start date, end date (last proven contact), and duration of employment at bank 
(4) Analyst name(s) 
(5) Total number of analysts covering the firm 
(6) SIC Code of the firm 
(7) Market capitalization of the firm 
(8) Employment history as analyst? 
(9) Start date, end date, and duration of board appointment (for prior board banking ties) 
(10) Type of investment banking relationship with the bank, if any 
 
Since we need to extract this information from the Biography Column, we might not be able 
to fill all categories for every banking tie. However, our current dataset provides information in the 
Biography Column for 91% (cp. Table 4) of all results. Missing data need to be extracted from other 
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sources and researched individually. For example, the above mentioned banking tie example does 
not clearly indicate the time frame that Dr. Eric Chen spent at J.P. Morgan. However, using 
information provided by LinkedIn, we can trace back Dr. Chen’s employment at J.P. Morgan to be 
between 1998 and 2002.  
 
We learned from Granovetter (1973) and Granovetter (1983) that weak ties can be an 
important source for new information coming into the personal network. In our context, this has 
been underlined by the example of Valentine (2011) who got significant information from a 
company employee (cp. Quote p.36). For a banking tie, however, it might provide an indication for 
the relevance of the banking tie. Similar to the regression made in Hwang and Kim (2009) we can 
define a measure of tie strength between board member i and bank j at time t. 
 
(1) 
 
𝝎𝟏: Relevance of affiliation/subsidiary 
 𝝎𝟐: Relevance of previous position  
 𝝎𝟑: Relevance of duration of previous employment 
 𝝎𝟒: Last contact to previous employment 
 𝝎𝟓: Other influences 
           𝒂𝟏- 𝒂𝟓: Individual weight 
 
𝜔1 measures the network distance from the previous employment. Employment settings at research 
or investment banking departments at the parent companies are more likely to create relevant 
network ties for information transfer than employment settings in subsidiaries. 𝜔2 indicates how 
relevant the previous bank employment was. We can assume that executive positions in the bank 
are of higher value than others since the centrality of such positions is higher and, therefore, more 
network connections within the bank are being made. In addition, the duration of employment plays 
a significant role for the number of people a banker will connect to (𝜔3). Furthermore, the last 
contact to the old employer (𝜔4), is an indicator for the network strength, which can be assumed to 
decrease over time. At last, there might be other influences such as other network ties (e.g. alumni 
ties) that strongly influence the network strength (𝜔5) and, therefore, should be weighted (𝑎1- 𝑎5) stronger.   
, , 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5Tie Strength i j t α ω α ω α ω α ω α ω= + + + +
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CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
6.1. Research Proposal 
As next step of our study we would like to test our hypothesis if banking ties facilitate the 
transmission of proprietary information or if such a past employment network vanishes instead 
when the banker switches into an executive board position. We would like to outline the path for 
further research using analyst recommendations as proxy to test our hypothesis by comparing 
recommendations made by banks that facilitate a banking tie with the consensus of 
recommendations without a banking tie. Our literature review indicates that the implementation of 
Reg FD was successful (e.g. Cohen et al. (2010); Kirk and Vincent (2011)). Hence, we can assume 
the expected differences between consensus and the individual recommendation to be more robust 
since statistical noise due to other sources of information is reduced. Using our research design we 
seek to contribute to previous papers that study the analyst research process, conflicts of interest, 
and the value of recommendations. By following the recommendations and comparing the stock 
performance we can find the premium of the banking tie to the old employer.  
Analysts provide a clear advice to the investor by prompting a specific course of action. 
Besides specific values for earnings estimates and price targets, recommendations are given on a 
scale from [1 = strong buy; 2 = buy; 3 = hold; 4 = sell; 5 = strong sell]. Historic analyst 
recommendations are available from different sources (cp. Table 5). 
 
Database Study 
THOMSON REUTERS First Call Womack (1996); Barber et al. (2006); Barber et al. (2007); 
Michaely and Womack (1999). 
THOMSON REUTERS I/B/E/S Busse et al. (2012); Agrawal and Chen (2005); Kadan et al. 
(2009); Ertimur et al. (2011); Ljungqvist et al. (2006). 
THOMSON Research Investext Asquith et al. (2005); Wahlen and Wieland (2011). 
ZACKS Investment Research Asquith et al. (2005); Barber et al. (2001); Chen and Jiang 
(2006); Jegadeesh et al. (2004). 
Table 5 – Historic Analyst Recommendations Data Sources Used by previous Studies 
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We expect analysts with banking ties to issue better recommendation and outperform their 
peers based on the superior information via the banking tie. This fact will reward the analyst and the 
bank with increased reputation and trading commissions. However, in return, the analyst or bank 
might be biased for future banking services to the banking tie’s company.  
For our approach we follow the methodology of previous studies of Barber et al. (2007) and 
Cohen et al. (2010) and use a standard calendar time portfolio approach to assess analysts’ 
recommendation performance with a banking tie relative to the consensus with no banking tie. We 
built two different portfolios representing the two different courses of actions: (1) adding a new 
stock or (2) dropping a stock from the investment portfolio. The former is represented by analysts 
who initiate, reiterate or upgrade stocks with the rating of buy or strong buy. The latter is 
represented by analysts’ opposite courses of action (i.e. initiating, reiterating or downgrading a 
stock with sell or strong sell). In addition, analysts may not update or drop a stock from their 
coverage which can be accounted for by setting a fixed time constrained (e.g. 12 months in Cohen 
et al. (2010)) after which the stock automatically gets dropped from the portfolio (if not updated or 
not stated as dropped earlier). Each stock enters the portfolio the day after the recommendation 
announcement to provide enough time for the information to be incorporated into the market. 
Hence, following previous studies, we do not include the first-day returns of following the stock.54 
For the buy portfolios we can calculate the daily return tR at the close of trading day t as follows 
(Barber et al., 2007): 
 1 1
1 1
jt
jt
nn
ijt it ijt
i j
t nn
ijt
i j
x r
R
x
ω
= =
= =
⋅ ⋅
=
∑∑
∑∑
      (2) 
where itr  is our return of stock i on trading day t, ijtω is the recommendation scale weight of analyst 
j for stock i on day t, and ijtx is a binary variable indicating if the stock is being covered by analyst j. 
Averaging over all analysts covering one particular stock and all other stocks being covered, we 
receive the daily return of the portfolio. Similarly, we can calculate the return of our sell portfolio 
                                                          
 
54 Compare to the studies of Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) reporting past stock returns within in a short time frame 
of the announcement.  
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but reverse the recommendation scale weight so that a higher value corresponds to a more 
unfavorable recommendation (cp. Cohen et al. (2010)). 
Using this method, we will receive time series of changing returns for each portfolio for 
which we can compare the investment performances of connected analysts compared to their peers 
without a banking tie. In addition, we will calculate the risk-adjusted abnormal returns as presented 
in Daniel et al. (1997) and Carhart (1997) for a better comparison. To further understand our results, 
we can employ panel regression to our two portfolios (cp. Cohen et al. (2010)) and control for the 
influence of different characteristics of our banking ties (e.g. previous position in the bank, 
brokerage size, firm size, analyst rating, tie strength). For the sensitivity analysis we need to check 
the potential influence of a banking tie premium is still significant when removing the most 
prominent and best connected analysts from our two portfolios.    
Our categorization into the two portfolios yields to analysts’ advice for recommendations as 
well as the time span that lies between recommendation revisions. Alternations can be done by only 
analyzing portfolios recommendations changes, excluding coverage initiation and resumptions.   
Stock recommendations are one of the measures to compare privileged analysts (with a 
banking tie) to the consensus. For further evaluation we would also like to study the other key 
elements of an analyst report, (1) Price Target (e.g. Asquith et al. (2005) or Bonini et al. (2010)) 
and (2) Earnings Estimate (e.g. Fleischer and Baum (2010) or Horton (2010)) and compare the 
performance of connected analysts with their peers with no banking tie.    
 
6.2 Research Outlook 
Our database of banking ties allows us to look at multiple other interesting research topics. Many of 
them had been previously attempted, but can now be further elaborated in the context of our new 
underlying source of information. Banking ties may affect all dimensions of companies’ and banks’ 
businesses, potentially leading to a number of conflicts of interests for both involved parties. The 
banking tie can be seen as a driver for the bank’s business improving the efficiency in information 
flow, research, and risk evaluation. Since most valuable information through this channel would 
ignore disclosure laws and firm internal policies (cp. (Massachusetts, 2012)), it can be assumed that 
bankers only consult the banking tie when expecting a personal reward or benefit. This could be in 
the form of creating better research reports or by establishing new investment deals to customers 
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and, therefore, promoting the personal career. This automatically translates to banks benefits of 
winning business deals, new customer relationships and, hence, additional revenue, which then also 
induces a firm’s management to only loosely enforce laws. The same logic holds for the board 
member expecting similar rewards of the network connection. For example, the banking tie may 
allow the banker to evaluate the risk of potential customers more accurately by having better 
informational access to customer’s business.55 The board member is being rewarded since the bank 
is able to offer better banking deal conditions (e.g. for a lending relationship) and, therefore, has a 
competitive advantage in costs over competitors. However, besides legal consequences, drawbacks 
include, for example, the bank evaluating risk incorrectly (i.e. deceptive information from the 
banking tie) which causes liability issues for shareholders. 
A social network mapping of the relationship of a bank to the company could bring new insights to 
the table. Ideally, we would not only like to know which banks are connected to which companies, 
but we would also like to get more detailed information on a personal level (who knows each other? 
Who were likely to meet? Are there any other network connection between people besides 
employment?). Without having additional information on-hand, this will be a challenging 
assignment. However, corporate structures (i.e. organizational chart) could be used as a proxy to 
map people working in the same department or supervising others. But as pointed out by Nohria 
(1998)56 “hidden networks” (e.g. alumni ties) should also be considered where possible to get a 
better picture how banking ties look in practice.  
A number of research questions related to our study that we would like to consider in the future are 
listed below. Ultimately, we would like to estimate the value of a banking tie for each of the 
participants to infer the competitive advantage that banking ties generate.   
(1) The bank has an interest in promoting its own business as lender. Following Kroszner and 
Strahan (2001) and Dittmann et al. (2010) who find that “banks do tend to lend more to the 
industries of firms on which the bank has board representation”, we would like to 
investigate if their results also hold for banking ties that are not employed with the bank 
anymore, but might have other (personal) incentives to promote their old employer as a 
                                                          
 
55 This is particularly true for our dataset since the banking tie is always to the management board of the company.  
56 “Informal or ‘emergent’ network relationships (...) are just as important in understanding networks in organizations. 
(…) Identifying and analyzing these ‘hidden’ networks can be of great significance in understanding organizations.” 
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lender. The conflict of interests involved might bias the board member and might have 
consequences for the company’s shareholders.    
(2) A bank might not only promote the lending business, but might also use the investment 
service as part of a sweetheart deal triggering services in return (a company might do the 
same). A banking tie offers a bank a more intimate insight into a company (i.e. more 
available information and increased trust to the company based on the personal connection). 
For lending agreements, such insights are highly valuable for evaluating the risks and might 
allow the bank to offer preferred credit ratings and lending terms. As presented in the work 
of Engelberg et al. (2012), our banking tie dataset allows us to analyze if connected banks 
are being favorably treated as borrowers ex-ante (i.e. better lending terms), if their 
performance justifies this behavior ex-post the banking service and relate the company to 
the other banking services (e.g. recommendations). 
(3) Similar questions arise for other investment banking service like M&A advisory (or 
underwriting relationships). Does a banking tie influence the board’s decision for M&A 
advisors (e.g. as a favor to a friend in the bank)? Dittmann et al. (2010) indicate that current 
BANKERS ON THE BOARD do promote M&A advisory proving motivation for further 
research. We would like to know if a banking tie causes the same results or if it differs from 
bankers that are still employed by the bank (cp. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) or Dittmann et 
al. (2010)). 
(4) Does analysts’ optimistic behavior change (e.g. when competing for investment services) 
based on the connection to the board? Do investors recognize such well-connected and less 
optimistic analysts?  
(5) Following the findings of Malloy (2005) showing that geographically proximate analysts 
demonstrate a competitive advantage in their performance, we would like to analyze such 
effects for proximate banking ties as well. The geographical distance might have an 
increased effect on top of the close network distance. 
(6) What are the trade-offs for the bank and the board executive in deal-making? What are the 
risks involved and how are deals made? Are surrounding network connections aware of a 
banking tie and does a banking tie cause banks’ employees to hide these connections? 
Analysts, for example, might be overcautious to protect the banks and their own reputation 
and, therefore, cause a contrary effect. However, as seen in 2.1.2, proprietary and 
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advantageous information can be hidden in model assumptions. Hence, justifications 
mentioned in research reports might differ for connected analysts and could therefore also 
be used as proxy.  
(7) How does the one-sided network influence the deal? The board member has access to a wide 
network (i.e. the past employment network connections in the bank) whereas the bank only 
has access to a comparably smaller network in the company (i.e. to the one board member). 
How does this situation affect the analysts’ biases and the deal-making? Is the board 
member using its multiple network connection bank executives in different departments to 
establish sweetheart deals?  
(8) As indicated earlier, we would also like to take a more sociological perspective, possibly 
complement our dataset more data (e.g. alumni connections or connections within a bank). 
Social network theory (cp. 2.3.1) provides some powerful tools to analyze networks on 
centrality and interlocked networks (cp. for example Mariolis and Jones (1982)) for which 
our new underlying data source could bring new insights. A visual mapping (e.g. using the 
open source Gephi software package) of banking ties would be desirable for further insights.  
(9) We would like to understand what kind of information is being transferred through banking 
ties. In particular, we would like to find out if actors are behaving self-serving (i.e. 
potentially damaging a friends or network contact interests) and only reveal positive news 
via the banking tie and withholding information that could harm their firm’s or personal 
success. Cohen et al. (2010) found that network members may, in fact, only reveal positive 
news which raises the question of the credibility and usefulness of banking tie information. 
(10) Does the number of banking ties in analyst’s stock coverage portfolio influence the 
probability of becoming an All-Star analyst? This question has been pursued by Cohen et al. 
(2010) and proven to be true for the case of school-ties.  
(11) Previous studies have shown the influence of external network ties on the corporate 
governance debate (e.g. Kroszner and Strahan (2001); Fracassi and Tate (2012)). Our 
dataset raises similar questions. Are companies headhunting bankers on purpose for board 
appointments? Does this banking increase a bank’s or company’s shareholders’ risk?  
(12) As shown in Brochet (2011), analysts’ stock coverage decisions are influenced by the 
network members they are connected to (i.e. analysts have a tendency to change coverage if 
executives travel). We would like to investigate if analysts change their coverage decision 
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when the banker switches into the board of a company (or when he or she gets promoted 
into the board if there is an intermediate job position). Do analysts base their coverage on 
banks’ banking ties in place? Are analysts covering stocks that do not fit into their portfolio 
based on the banking tie? Do analysts show improved performance after the banking tie has 
been established (for stock overages that were in place before and after the banker’s job 
change). 
(13) Are companies with a banking tie more prone to trading restricted securities? Insider trading 
is legally restricted and is therefore, by nature, not traceable. However, insiders may buy or 
sell stocks if they comply with SEC’s Rule 144. Part of the regulations is that insiders are 
required to announce their sale of security and by filling Form 144.57. Fillings can be 
accessed in the SEC’s EDGAR database and used to analyze whether increased legal insider 
trading occurred which can be interpreted as a proxy for information flow between analyst 
and board member for which the latter might profit from early research results (i.e. did the 
banking tie sell stocks before or after analyst announcement?).   
                                                          
 
57 Compare to: http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm [accessed 11/01/2012]. 
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CHAPTER VII 
LIMITATIONS & CONCLUSION 
 
LIMITATIONS 
As mentioned earlier and listed in Watts (2003, p.20ff) research in social network theory has 
“suffered from a number of methodological and phenomenological difficulties.” Our empirical work 
provides a unique dataset with a large number of banking ties. However, our database is limited in 
revealing pairs of interconnected networks separated by a direct link or a short chain of 
intermediaries. It does not indicate how intertwined the networks and the strength of the tie between 
two particular networks are. Analyst recommendations can be used as proxy for the information 
flow that the analyst is receiving through the network. However, we cannot prove if analyst and 
board member are directly connected or if the short network distance through intermediate network 
members (i.e. common friends in the bank) allows valuable information to be transmitted. This is 
particularly true for situations where the board member came from a subsidiary, or if the time of 
employment of analyst and board member at the bank did not overlap, meaning that both have 
never worked together at the bank at a given point of time. Pursuing our outlined research outlook 
(e.g. price target or analyst recommendation comparison) lets us further investigate our strong 
hypothesis and will allow us to give more precise statements about the strength of the banking ties. 
We agree with the notion of Fleischer (2011) that such network effects are only advantages if the 
information being transferred through the banking tie is selective and restricted to a very small part 
of the network since the informational advantage would otherwise vanish.    
For the case of analyst recommendations, it is unclear if a connected analyst is 
outperforming non connected colleagues based on the selective information disclosure or if the 
analyst might just be able to assess management performance better based on the prior common 
work experience.  
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CONCLUSION 
We reviewed three different research fields in the context of our study. First, we studied the 
analyst profession and what is known on their current best practices in performing stock research. 
We identified qualitative information as one of the main drivers for stock research’s success. 
Second, the review of analysts’ biases revealed analyst’s multifaceted role leading to various 
conflicts of interests. Third, social network theory and related studies gave us the necessary insights 
and proved the power and influence of social networks. We identified 2715 BANKERS ON THE 
BOARD with previous employment at a bank using personal information from 55724 prior and 
current board members of 3560 U.S. listed firms. We created a new and unique database of such 
banking ties that maps direct or short distance network ties of company board members to a bank 
performing investment research for their company. We presented multiple incentives for bankers or 
board members to take advantage of these networks by using these channels for information 
exchange and benefits. This allowed us to outline several relevant research questions for the future 
study of banking biases. We illustrated the path for one of the research questions – biases in analyst 
recommendation. Our empirical work is the foundation for pursuing these questions.  
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 Biographical (bio) 
 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
 Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
 National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
 New York Stock Exchange’s Regulatory Committee (NYSE) 
 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
 United States (U.S.) 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA SET LIMITATIONS 
 
(1) In our data collection for banks’ subsidiaries, we excluded Current Investments, Current 
Investments, Current Investment Arms and Merged Entities. 
(2) We excluded connections for which we were not sure if subsidy and biographical 
information fitted (e.g. subsidy:  Van der Woolen Specialist and biographical entry: Van der 
Woolen Holding). In such cases we consulted internet sources and only included the 
matching if we found a strong indication for a common bond. 
(3) We also excluded matchings for which the affiliation to the bank was very weak and not 
based on an active employment (e.g. Mrs. XY was guest speaker at Bank of America).  
(4) We accounted for merging or acquisition of banks if it was indicated by the biographical 
data (e.g. “Ms. Elliott served for four years at Boatmen's National Bank (now Bank of 
America)”). We can assume that the network connections also moved and, therefore, are 
relevant.  
(5) We cannot guarantee that we inferred all connections in our dataset to a full extend. Some 
biographical entries include outdated company/bank designations or abbreviations for which 
cannot guarantee that we all covered.  
(6) Bio data might sometimes just indicate the name of the parent company and not the division 
or subsidiary. In such cases we consulted the World Wide Web and other indication in the 
biographical information for clear indication on the connection. For example, while 
searching Citigroup, Research Division and its subsidiary Primerica Financial Services 
Insurance, we found the bio entry “He was joined Primerica Corporation, a diversified 
financial services company, in 1982 and served in various positions until 1988”, which did 
not provided a clear signal for a banking tie. 
(7) Bio data do not have a standard format. First, bio data, include spelling mistakes or typos 
which we couldn’t account for. Second, different word orders are sometime used in the bio 
data which we accounted for by searching only for a single string (e.g. subsidy Putnam 
Lovell, bio entry of Putnam, Lovell and search for Putnam). Third, bio data include 
abbreviations (e.g. AAMC for American Association for Medical Colleges) which might 
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have caused data loss. Fourth, different spelling of company (Credit Agricole instead of 
Crédit Agricole) names might have caused data loss. 
(8) While consulting the World Wide Web, we occasionally found updates to the subsidiary 
structure or indications for a banking tie (e.g. Lockhart, H. Eugene connected to Argus 
Information & Advisory Services which is part of Argus Research Company). 
(9) We found errors in the robustness of our dataset retrieved from the Capital IQ database. For 
example, the subsidiary excel file of Banco Santander includes multiple rows of the same 
content (rows 466 - 484 matches rows 508 – 522). Also, we found random Chinese 
characters in the bio information of McCourt, David C. (Prior Board) which caused Excel 
to crash and we, therefore, deleted the data entry.   
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APPENDIX C 
INVESTOR’S NEEDS 
 
Rank Attribute 
1 Integrity / Professionalism 
2 Industry knowledge 
3 Accessibility / Responsiveness 
4 Special services (company visits, conferences, etc.) 
5 Written reports 
6 Management access (one-to-one) 
7 Useful / Timely calls & visits  
8 Local market knowledge / Country knowledge 
9 Financial models 
10 Idea generation 
11 Research delivery (entitlement, technology & customization of buy-side needs) 
12 Earnings estimates 
Table 6 – Survey All-American Investor Team-What Investors really Want58  
  
                                                          
 
58 Investor (2011) 
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APPENDIX D 
INFORMATION CHANNELS 
 
Information Source Used frequently or always 
• Income Statement 100% 
• Balance Sheet 100% 
• Cash Flow Statement 97.1% 
• Financial Statement Footnotes 97% 
• Management Discussion & Analysis 94.2% 
• Company Management 94.1% 
• Industry Reports 88.3% 
• Form 10-K Report 82.4% 
• Form 10-Q Report 76.4% 
• Other Analysts’ Research  73.6% 
• Preliminary Financial Figures 72.7% 
• Information from other Companies in the 
same (or related) industry 
70.6% 
• Consensus Earnings Forecast 67.7% 
• Consensus Earnings Forecast 67.7% 
• Financial Press 58.8% 
• Users of a Company’s Products/Services 
• Other sources   
47% 
Not asked in the survey 
Table 7 – Key Information Sources Used for Analyst Research59 
 
  
                                                          
 
59 Based on the survey of 34 analysts in the study of Graham et al. (2002). We listed the accumulated percentage of 
analysts who responded to use the information source as frequently or always. Other options were given as sometimes, 
rarely or never. 
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APPENDIX E 
STOCK RESEARCH DRIVERS & LIMITATIONS
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APPENDIX F 
CAPITAL IQ SCREENING CRITERIA 
 
Criteria Filter 
Index Dow Jones Composite Average  
|| NASDAQ Composite  
|| S&P 500 
|| S&P 1000 
 
Board Job 
Function 
Vice Chairman || Chairman Emeritus || Chairman of the Board || Co-
Chairman of the Board || Member of the Board of Directors || United Board 
Members || Vice Chairman Emeritus || Director Emeritus || Member of 
Management Board || Member of Supervisory Board || Member of Advisory 
Board || Chairman of Supervisory Board || Member of Corporate Board || 
Vice Chairman of Supervisory Board || Vice Chairman of Management 
Board || Chairman of Management Board || Chairman of Advisory Board || 
Chairman of Corporate Board || Co-Chairman of Advisory Board || Co-
Chairman of Corporate Board || Co-Chairman of Management Board || Co-
Chairman of Supervisory Board || Vice Chairman of Advisory Board || Vice 
Chairman of Corporate Board 
 
Geographic 
Location 
Europe || Asia / Pacific || Africa / Middle East || United States and Canada || 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Industry 
Classification 
Energy || Materials || Industrials || Consumer Discretionary || Consumer 
Staples || Healthcare || Financials || Information Technology || 
Telecommunication Services || Utilities  
|| Biographies: Keyword: bank 
|| # of analysts: ≥ 0  
 
Key 
Developments 
All History 
Table 8 – Capital IQ Screening Criteria60 
  
                                                          
 
60 Data retrieved: June 2011 
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APPENDIX G 
BOARD MEMBERS’ PREVIOUS BANKING POSITIONS 
 
We collected typical previous or current employment positions of company board members at a 
bank (as mentioned in the bio information). This includes:  
 Director, Lead Director, Lead Independent Director, Independent Director, Managing Director, 
Advisory Director, Independent Non-Executive Director 
 President, Vice President, Executive Vice President, Executive Vice President-Operations, 
Group Vice President 
 Chief Executive Officer, Group Chief Risk Officer, Chief Financial Officer 
 (Vice-) Chairman, Chairman of Leadership Foundation, Deputy Chairman 
 Head of Finance Group, Global Head 
 Member of the Executive Council, Member of the Advisory Board, Member of the Beirat, 
Member of the Executive Committee 
 Advisor, Senior Advisor, Investment Advisor, Special Advisor, Chief Science Advisor 
 Manager, Deputy Branch Manager; Deputy Branch Office Manager, Investment Manager, Risk 
Manager, Managing Member, Portfolio Manager  
 Member of the Management Board, Board Member 
 Controller 
 Officer, Principal Accounting Officer 
 Investment Banker, Commercial Banker 
 (Global) Head / Co-Head of a department 
 Equity Analyst, M&A Analyst, Technology Analyst 
 (Independent) Trustee 
 Principal (in Institutional Equity) 
 Partner, General Partner, Operating Partner 
 Consultant 
 Associate 
 Founder (of a department/company), Founding Member  
 Treasurer 
 Head of Corporate Clients 
 Various senior positions 
 No job description  
(e.g. “Mr. Griffin served in the Project Finance Advisory Group of UBS from 1993 to 1996”) 
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